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ABSTRACT
AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF DECEPTION FOR CYBER
DEFENSE
FEBRUARY 2020
KIMBERLY J. FERGUSON-WALTER
B.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA IRVINE
M.Sc., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Brian Levine
The threat of cyber attacks is a growing concern across the world, leading to
an increasing need for sophisticated cyber defense techniques. The Tularosa Study,
was designed and conducted to understand how defensive deception, both cyber and
psychological, affects cyber attackers Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c]. More specifically,
for this empirical study, cyber deception refers to a decoy system and psychological
deception refers to false information of the presence of defensive deception techniques
on the network. Over 130 red teamers participated in a network penetration test over
two days in which we controlled both the presence of and explicit mention of deceptive
defensive techniques. To our knowledge, this represents the largest study of its kind
ever conducted on a skilled red team population. In addition to the abundant host
and network data collected, we conducted a battery of questionnaires, e.g., experience,
personality; and cognitive tasks, e.g., fluid intelligence, working memory; as well as
vi
physiological measures, e.g., galvanic skin response (GSR), heart rate, to be correlated
with the cyber events at a later date. The design and execution of this study and the
lessons learned are a major contribution of this thesis. I investigate the effectiveness
of decoy systems for cyber defense by comparing performance across all experimental
conditions. Results support a new finding that the combination of the presence of
deception and the true information that deception is present has the greatest effect
on cyber attackers, when compared to a control condition in which no deception was
used. Evidence of cognitive biases in the red teamers’ behavior is then detailed and
explained, to further support our theory of oppositional human factors (OHF). The
final chapter discusses how elements of the experimental design contribute to the
validity of assessing the effectiveness of cyber deception and reviews trade-offs and
lessons learned.
vii
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AN INTRODUCTION TO CYBER DECEPTION
Humans are subject to cognitive limitations and bias, which can lead to lower
quality decision making and flawed behaviors. While cyber attackers often take ad-
vantage of these limitations (e.g., spearphishing, and spam), it has been less explored
for cyber defense. As network owners, defenders can use their home-field advantage to
present information to attackers in specific ways to take advantage of and exacerbate
innate human biases to delay, disrupt, or deter the attack. Deception for cyber de-
fense advances that goal: to rebalance the asymmetric nature of computer defense by
increasing attacker workload while decreasing that of the defender through strategic
interactions with the human behind the cyber attack.
Creating a system that is always protected and secure is a far-reaching goal.
While it is important for researchers to continue to move systems closer towards
this absolute security, it is also essential to create techniques so a system can defend
against an attacker who circumvents the current security defenses. Many techniques
have been developed to increase the speed and accuracy of detecting intrusion activity
at the perimeter with the aim of making a cyber defender’s job easier Buczak and
Guven [2016], Modi et al. [2013]. However, beyond a priori hardening of systems,
less research has been done on techniques to make attackers’ tasks harder. Deception
for cyber defense is an emerging area of research aimed at just that. Deception holds
promise as a successful tactic for making an attacker’s job harder because it does
more than just block access: it can also cause the attacker to waste both time and
effort. Moreover, deception can be used by a defender to impart an incorrect belief
in the attacker, the effects of which can go beyond any static defense.
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In scenarios involving network intrusion, an attacker only knows what is perceived
through observation of the target network. The intruder is often thousands of miles
away from the network to which he or she is attempting to gain entry. Networks
often unintentionally provide more information to an attacker than defenders would
like. However, the network owner also has the opportunity to reveal information he or
she desires the attacker to know, including deceptive information. Because network
information is often complex and incomplete, it provides a natural environment in
which to imbed deception since, in chaos, there is opportunity. Deception can alter
the mindset, confidence, and decision-making process of an attacker, which can have
more significant effects than traditional defenses. Furthermore, using deception for
defensive purposes gives the defender at least partial control of what an attacker
knows. This control sets the stage for defenders to shape attacker reactions for a
variety of purposes.
While many different types of cyber deception techniques exist, as described in two
recent textbooks on the topic Heckman et al. [2015], Rowe and Rrushi [2016], our re-
search has selected decoys systems as its focus. Industry has started to adopt and ad-
vertise these techniques; examples include: Canary Thinkst Applied Research [2019],
CyberChaff
TM
Galois [2019], ShadowPlex Acalvio [2019], Illusive Platform Illusive
Networks [2019], DeceptionGrid
TM
TrapX Security [2019], and, Fidelis Deception R©
Fidelis Cybersecurity [2019]. However, as far as can be determined, the commercial
solutions are missing the critical components of human-subjects testing for evalua-
tion of effectiveness. It is essential to understand attacker behavior and reactionsto
best defend against them. This scientific endeavor goes beyond cyber deception by
investigating how to play on an attacker’s cognitive biases and cognitive load to make
attacking systems more difficult. We also examine how to use experimentally collected
data to help design an adaptive defensive system.
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Traditional cyber security techniques have led to an asymmetric disadvantage for
defenders. The defender must detect all possible threats at all times from all attackers
and defend all systems against all possible exploitation. In contrast, an attacker only
needs to find a single path to defenders’ critical information. We believe this asym-
metry can be re-balanced using cyber deception to change the attacker’s perception
of the network environment, and lead attackers to false beliefs about which systems
contain critical information or are critical to a defender’s computing infrastructure.
Our contributions hinge on performing rigorous experimentation.
While the effect and effectiveness of deceptive technologies have been hypothesized
for more than a decade, scientifically rigorous studies of the comparative effectiveness
of attackers on systems with and without deception are lacking. The goal of our
research is to start to fill that gap, and provide a scientific assessment of the effec-
tiveness of decoy systems. Another objective is to examine how to use deception to
better understand and influence an attacker that has already infiltrated a network to
ultimately delay, deter, and deny an attack. This can be done by taking actions that
motivate the attacker to respond in specific ways to enhance the ability to detect,
identify, understand, and thus defend against said attacker.
Our pilot studies Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017], the rigorous Tulsarosa Study
Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c] and the collected data we describe in Chaper 2 are
a significant contribution to the cyber defense community by furthering our under-
standing of deception as a defensive tactic. The experimental design and data analysis
is a key component of the contribution of this thesis. To our knowledge, it is to date
the largest controlled experiment with skilled attackers that held constant the tools
and exploits available to the attacker, the network topology and vulnerabilities on the
network, and the time participants had to launch attacks. In addition, the amount of
data collected during and after the attacks is unprecedented (516 Gigabyte (GB) of
data, plus an additional 1537 GB (compressed) of screen capture video). This thesis
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provides some results that address the main hypotheses of the experiment, including
the effectiveness of decoy systems for cyber defense and the impact of knowledge of
deception; and, the scale and breadth of data collected in this controlled study will
allow for further future analyses in future work.
There are many research questions of interest that studies such as the Tularosa
Study can help address. What elements of an experimental design contribute to
the validity of assessing the effectiveness of cyber deception? How effective is cyber
deception against skilled attackers? How does an attacker’s evasion of detection
change based on the presence of cyber deception? How does an attacker’s cognitive
attributes such as frustration and confusion change in the presence of cyber deception?
How does an attacker’s success in performing cyber attacks change with the presence
of cyber deception? Is just the suspicion of cyber deception being present enough to
influence attacker behavior? How does an attacker’s evasion of detection change based
on the suspicion of cyber deception? How does an attacker’s cognitive attributes such
as frustration and confusion change in the suspicion of cyber deception? How does
an attacker’s success in performing cyber attacks change with the suspicion of cyber
deception? Is cyber deception more or less effective when the attacker is aware it
is being used? How does cyber, versus psychological, deception affect an attackers
feeling of frustration, confusion and self-doubt? How do increased levels of frustration,
confusion, and self-doubt impact performance of cyber attackers? Are cognitive biases
observed in cyber attacker behaviors? Which cognitive biases can be intensified to
disrupt cyber attacks? We will focus on addressing a subset of these questions as part
of our contributions summarized below. The main focus of this thesis is to assess the
effectiveness of a cyber deception technique and its impact on cyber attack behavior
and to address whether knowledge concerning use of deception as a defense reduces
its impact.
Summary of Contributions
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• We perform a literature review and pilot studies Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017]
and then design and conduct a rigorous experiment with skilled red teamers to
assess the effectiveness of cyber deception Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c].
• We compare performance on the cyber task between control and experimen-
tal conditions. We address the following performance measures: resources ex-
pended, number of vulnerabilities identified, successful exploits, ability to evade
detection.
• We compare performance on the cyber task between control condition and psy-
chological deception condition.
• We compare performance on the cyber task between conditions where partici-
pants were informed about deception to where they were not informed.
• We compare level of emotional and cognitive effects reported between control
group and experimental conditions and then compare level of cognitive effects
reported to performance on the cyber task across all conditions.
• We catalog the types of cognitive biases observed in the cyber deception ex-
periments, providing corroboration to our theory of oppositional human fac-
tors Gutzwiller et al. [2018] aiding cyber defense.
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CHAPTER 1
BACKGROUND
Long before computers existed1, information protection through deception was
widely demonstrated. In the 5th century, B.C., Sun Tzu wrote that “all warfare
is based on deception” Sun-tzu and Griffith [1963]. Deception is the provision of
misinformation that is realistic enough to confuse an adversary’s situational awareness
and to influence and misdirect the adversary’s perceptions and decision processes. The
ultimate target of deception is the adversary’s mind, and it has been asserted that
altering an enemy’s perception of reality through defensive deception can potentially
level the cyber battleground Climek et al. [2015], Ormrod [2014].
1.1 Related Work
In an extensive review of deception and surprise, Whaley defined the types of de-
ception employed in kinetic military operations throughout the ages, including hiding
the real by masking, repackaging, and dazzling and revealing the false by mimicking,
inventing, and decoying Whaley [2007]. This taxonomy has begun to be applied to
the cyber domain, with the concept of deception for cyber defense recently gain-
ing traction Almeshekah and Spafford [2014], Brzeczko et al. [2014], Heckman et al.
[2013], Provos [2004], Vollmer and Manic [2014]. One common technique investigated
is the use of honeypots to lure attackers to allow containment and observation of
1Sections in this chapter are based on published work: K. J. Ferguson-Walter, D. S. LaFon, and
T. B. Shade, Friend or Faux: Deception for Cyber Defense, Journal of Information Warfare (JIW),
vol. 16, no. 2, p. 28-42, 2017.
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them Bringer et al. [2012]. This technique has been explored and expanded upon
in many ways Campbell et al. [2015a]. Researchers have also created a technology
that presents an adversary with a false network topology Trassare et al. [2013]. Oth-
ers have created a framework for deception to assist in the analysis of deceptions,
whether it involves people or computers, networks of people or computers, or people
paired with computers Cohen and Koike [2003]. Honeypot effectiveness has been
tested using cyber security games, revealing how different setups may cause attackers
to change their operations to avoid negative outcomes Aggarwal et al. [2016]. Re-
search on honeypots have motivated many other types of deceptive techniques that
can benefit cyber defense. Honey-patches are similar to decoys, in that they provide
a false vulnerability to an attacker, they then automatically redirect an attacker who
attempts to exploit that vulnerability to a honeypot Araujo et al. [2014]. Based on
the success of honeypots, Rowe et al., made real systems look like honeypots to deter
attacks and confuse attackers Rowe et al. [2007]. This idea is a critical one, since
there is a limit to what can be done to make fake systems look more real (before they
simply become real systems), and working to make real systems look more fake is a
good strategy for ensuring it is difficult for attackers to determine which systems hold
real value.
Research on honeypots and deceptive content has taken several paths. Honeypots
Canali and Balzarotti [2013], Lim, Sze Li Harry [2006] and deceptive content Bowen
et al. [2009], Michael et al. [2004] have been shown to attract users on the Internet.
Patterns of attacker behavior have been investigated through deploying honeypots
on the Internet Nicomette et al. [2011] and in testbeds Rowe et al. [2007]. Previ-
ous research has discussed that the configuration of honeypots can either encourage
or discourage attacks and identified some relevant design elements Frederick et al.
[2012]. Deep learning has been presented as one method of automatic evaluation
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of cyber deception techniques Ayoade et al. [2020]. The accumulated research has
demonstrated that techniques designed to deceive users are feasible.
To date, our contributions, described in Chapter 2, are the only research to focus
on rigorously evaluating the efficacy of decoy systems. Few cyber deception exper-
iments have been executed, and those that have been executed tend not to have
rigorous experimental control or a large enough sample size of participants that gen-
eralize to the desired population. Participants in studies with larger participant pools
typically use unknown parties from the Internet Michael et al. [2004], Nicomette et al.
[2011], Wagener et al. [2009].
A honeypot was deployed on the Internet for 419 days to characterize attack
behaviors Nicomette et al. [2011]. This interesting study observed over 500,000 SSH
connections and were able to identify stage one automated malware versus stage
two human attacks based on human characteristics such as typos. While they were
successful at better understanding the dictionaries used in dictionary attack in the
wild, they noted that the attackers interacting with the honeypot tended to be script
kiddies who were not familiar with the Unix access rights and did not delete the
history files.
Placing deception on internet-facing network nodes does attain adversarial activ-
ity, but it is lacks the internal validity of a controlled study. Additionally, it does not
allow for insight into the participants by way of reports or interviews. An alterna-
tive strategy is to design controlled studies using students from universities pursuing
technology-related degrees Cohen et al. [2001], Rowe et al. [2007]. However, this
lacks external validity, as the participant pool does not generalize well for predictive
results of sophisticated cyber attackers. Students lack the experience and mindsets
that would parallel the sophisticated adversaries these defenses are employed to de-
ceive. In our study, we look to address these issues by utilizing the closest analogous
group to malicious cyber adversaries available for scientific testing — red teamers —
8
and bringing in a larger number of participants in hopes of providing the statistical
power and reliability to detect effects.
There are several efforts within the research community working to address the
gap in empirical assessments of cyber deception techniques and strategies. There are
three main rigorous approaches to this problem: 1) simplifying cyber scenarios such
that a non-expert can be used as a reasonable participant; 2) creating realistic models
and simulations based on human behavior; 3) conducting studies with skilled partic-
ipants. There has been effort in abstracting realistic cyber attack environments for
experimentation with non-experts. Simulation tools, such as HackIT Aggarwal et al.
[2020], which simplifies and simulates network reconnaissance and attack, have been
developed and tested with undergraduate students to test the effect of introducing
deception at different timing intervals. These computer science undergraduates were
found to attack the honeypots more often than real machines. However, there were
not enough participants to make significance claims. Examining how to make models
more closely resemble real human behavior has also been examined within the context
of these simplified cyber games such as the FlipIt game Basak et al. [2018]. In this
two-player competitive game, there are resources each player wants to control and
they must spend an action (which has a cost) flipping that resource to gain or keep
control. For their study, 155 participants were recruited using Amazon Mechanical
Turk and asked to fill out the Short Dark Triad personality scale, which scores on
the following traits theorized to be relevant to some criminal hacking communities:
narcissism, Machiavellian, psychopathy. Their results indicated that are strategic
differences between different types of attackers and defenders.
Our work focuses on using skilled participants in controlled experiments. In Chap-
ter 5.1 we investigate how existing Capture-the-Flag exercises compare. Each different
type of deception may require a separate experimental design. Recent work describing
the Moonraker Study provides a design to assess host-based deception, using com-
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puter specialists as the participants pool Shade et al. [2020]. The participants in
the study are all unaware of the deception being used for defense, with the design
including a training cover story. While the Tularosa Study focused on decoys and
includes conditions explicitly made aware of the deception, there are some congruent
results between the studies discussed in Section 3.4.
1.2 Decoy Systems
While both are cyber deception techniques used for defensive purposes, decoy
systems, which is our research focus, differ from honeypot technology in several critical
ways. Traditionally, the main purposes of a honeypot is to draw an attacker away
from the true network and gather information about the attacker and the threats he
or she poses. Decoy systems tend to be embedded within the true network; and while
they can also capture some information (but less than high-interaction honeypots)
about attackers who interact with them, this capture of information is not their
primary purpose. Their primary purpose is to obfuscate the true network assets and
confuse the attacker about the true network topology. Attackers are known to recon
networks just to gather an understanding of the infrastructure so as to be better
prepared should they want to perform a specific attack on that network in the future.
Our red team tests, discussed in Chapter 2, demonstrate that decoy systems confuse
attackers and make them unsure or about the true topology.
While honeypots and decoys both lure an attacker by looking more enticing than
the real assets, decoy systems can also make the real assets harder to notice by taking
up a large share, if not the majority, of the address space. This deception increases
the likelihood that an attacker will interact with a decoy and, thereby, trigger an alert.
Decoys can also be used to make a homogeneous network appear more heterogeneous,
thus making the true attack surface much less obvious. For example, if the network
to protect only has servers running Linux RedHat5, decoys can be configured to
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not only add more RedHat5 servers, but also some other varieties of Linux, some
Windows servers, and a population of client machines. As a result, not only will the
amount of assets attackers need to consider be increased, but so will the number of
different types of potential attack vectors of which the attackers believe they can take
advantage.
Traditionally, honeypots are designed to be isolated from the real network they
intend to protect. They appear to contain information or resources of value to the
attacker. In this way, honeypots draw and hold an attacker’s interest to and within
the honeypots themselves, instead of to and within real network assets. With decoy
systems, the fake is interspersed with the real, and the decoy assets do not need
to be isolated to be effective. These shell assets can be low-fidelity, looking real
from the outside — from “far away” as tested by network scanning tools and other
red team activity. This is different from high-fidelity honeypots on which attackers’
time is wasted once they enter the honeypot because of this, pocket litter, detailed
information and realistic fake user activity, must be meticulously created and updated
by hand, a process that takes both a great deal of time and resources. By design,
most decoy systems do not require pocket litter because the intent may not be for an
attacker to enter a decoy asset. Attackers are detected just by interacting with the
decoy. This can allow for decoy systems to be a lightweight and inexpensive solution
that can be easily deployed, configured, and maintained. This ease of deployment
and reconfiguration makes this technique a prime candidate for combination with an
artificial intelligence system, described further in Section 1.4.
While it is likely to be an uncommon occurrence, there are use cases where a
legitimate user might accidentally interact with a decoy. We anticipate that this
behavior would look different than an unauthorized hacker interacting with a decoy.
For example, a benign user might accidentally mistype an IP address when trying
to SSH into a server on which they have permissions. However, we do not expect
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the authorized user to attempt multiple usernames and passwords, or use password
hacking software against the machine. This network and keystroke behavior will look
different between the mistaken and the malicious interaction.
Furthermore, if an attacker determines that they are in a traditional honeypot,
they will leave and likely re-attempt to attack the real network. With decoy systems,
even if the attacker identifies one decoy or knows it is present, the attacker still needs
to put in the work and time to differentiate each asset as real or fake and to take
extra precautions not to trigger an alert. Recent work has investigated combining
honeypot and decoy systems as well as using artificial intelligence to move towards
autonomous cyber deception Al-Shaer et al. [2019].
1.3 Adaptive Cyber Defense
Advanced cyber-defenses need to be able to respond to attacker activity in cyber
time—at the same speed as network traffic and cyber attacks. This requires intelligent
systems that can automatically react to malicious behavior and evolve their defenses
over time as attacks change. The artificial intelligence controlling the defensive system
must be able to look ahead and dynamically consider how an attacker might behave in
the future before taking a defensive action. The concept of adaptive or active cyber
defense Denning [2014] — where a system automatically prepares and implements
predictive defensive strategies or reacts to detected suspicious activity without human
intervention is gaining acceptance but has not yet been widely put into practice.
Cyber deception is also an emerging research area in cyber defense. Adaptive cyber
deception is a relatively new but inevitable extension of prior work, which cuts across
the computer security, behavioral science, and artificial intelligence communities.
There are many reasons why defensive techniques using cyber deception should
be adaptive. For example, surprise is one likely important element that can affect the
attacker’s decision processes and actions. When an attacker experiences unexpected
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results, they may decide to change strategies or retry the same techniques, either of
which will disrupt or delay their progress, giving defenders more time and opportu-
nity to react appropriately. Static cyber-deception techniques may cause surprise at
first, but over time this effect will wear off, as the attackers become familiar with
these techniques and learn what to expect from them. If the techniques are adaptive,
they will detect when the attacker has developed a response to the deception, and
will alter the deception accordingly. Surprise is only one example of how adaptive
cyber deception can negatively impact an attacker and disrupt their progress. There
are likely to be many more ways to affect an attacker (which we are currently investi-
gating), such as causing frustration, confusion, and self-doubt. These might cause an
attacker to increase the number of errors they perform making them easier to detect,
delay their attack until further defenses are in place or a critical task is complete, and
even deter an attacker from pursuing a particular target all together.
1.4 An Adaptive Decoy System
A 2015 Gartner Report on deception techniques included the following key finding
“Deception as an automated responsive mechanism represents a sea change in the
capabilities of the future of IT security that product managers or security programs
should not take lightly” Pingree [2015]. However in 2019 adaptive cyber-defense
systems are still in their infancy, and cyber deception is just a small piece in the cyber
defense landscape. We observe both a need to focus on adaptive cyber deception
systems and a gap in current research, and have proposed using game theory and
reinforcement learning to pursue autonomous cyber deception systems which can
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decide when, where, and how to best use deception based on attacker behavior Fugate
and Ferguson-Walter [2019].2
Our studies discussed in Chapter 2 suggest that decoy systems can be highly
effective at disrupting network reconnaissance, confusing an attacker by using their
cognitive biases against them, which can then increase the attacker’s cognitive load.
We theorize that these effects can be multiplied by allowing the decoys to be adaptive
to each adversary’s specific strategies and preferences. Furthermore, these initial
studies indicate that cyber deception may be as or more effective when the attacker
is actually informed that there is deception being used on the network for defensive
purposes.
Implementing an adaptive cyber-defense strategy in a real-world cyber environ-
ment necessitates capabilities that may not be deployed in a typical network. In
particular, it requires sensors, actuators, and a means of logically connecting inputs
to outputs, making decisions as to how and when to adapt.
1. Sensors collect information to detect behavioral-based adversarial activity such
as detecting scanning activity and logon attempts. More advanced sensors could
detect activity such as the attacker attempting to use stolen passwords and could
extend to post-exploitation activities, particularly when network assets contain
honey-tokens.
2. Actuators take an automated action on the network or host as directed. Ac-
tuation of decoys involve configuration changes, creating new decoys, changing
decoy parameters, modifying service banners, and other deceptive activities.
Further decoy adaptations could include changing the IP address, opening or
closing ports, adding or removing services, or even spoofing a different operating
2This section is based on published work: Fugate, S. and Ferguson-Walter, K. Artificial Intelli-
gence and Game Theory Models for Defending Critical Networks with Cyber Deception. AI Magazine,
Spring 2019.
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system. Not only are these specialized tasks not normally managed by modern
enterprise network management tools, but these tasks must be automated to
rapidly respond to suspicious activity.
Furthermore, cyber deception techniques can be used to do more than delay,
confuse and surprise an attacker. Cyber deception can be used to influence the attack
in more direct ways. For example, the defender may want to learn something specific
about an attacker or collect information about a specific type of attack. Deception
can be used to entice or convince an attacker to take an action that, unknown to
the attacker, actually benefits the defender in some way. This is important for cyber
defenders, since as we move forward into more adaptive cyber-defensive systems,
we must consider the natural co-evolution of multi-step, multi-stage attack/defense
situations. These advanced defenses must take a strategic view, where moves are
considered many steps ahead of both attacker and defender actions; this has been
referred to as cyber co-evolution Willard [2014].
1.4.1 Perceived Payoffs and Automated Strategy Selection
We have begun to investigate both game theory Roy et al. [2010] and reinforce-
ment learning Sutton and Barto [1998] techniques which may provide a good solution
when creating an adaptive decoy system Bilinski et al. [2019]. Cyber deception is
a powerful tool for defenders because it allows them to manipulate the game-board
which has traditionally only been a possibility for attackers. However, as the owners
of the network, cyber defenders should be able to control the information the network
distributes and potentially change the way the network behaves. In our estimation,
this type of game manipulation is able to give the defender an asymmetric advantage
over an attacker. The game-board can be manipulated in several ways which can
have various effects on the attacker.
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By changing the game-board, as the attacker perceives it, the defender is able
to limit the strategies available. If the attacker has the wrong information about a
system, the strategies they think are applicable to attack will likely fail. One major
advantage that cyber deception provides to a defender is the ability to change the
perceived payoff of a set of actions to the attacker. Each player is selecting actions
trying to maximize a long-term payoff. The payoff is an estimation of how good or bad
the outcome is for that player. Recall that many game theory games are structured
as zero sum where the payoffs for each outcome add up to zero across the players.
Since the defender can control the information the attacker uses to make his
decisions (and form his game tree), the defender can manipulate the payoffs the
attacker associates with certain paths. For example, a defender can make a system
look more vulnerable or more interesting. This will cause the attacker’s perceived
payoff for that machine to be much higher than the true payoff. Furthermore, if the
defender is using decoys or honeypots, the attacker’s perceived payoff may be very
high, while the true payoff is instead very high for the defender. This negative true
payoff for the attacker is due to the time and energy wasted on a fake system.
For a defender to make wise decisions about how to best protect their network and
systems, there are several useful things they need to know. First and foremost, the
defender will be more effective if they know when they are being attacked. They can
use proactive defenses including pre-set cyber deception techniques, but the effect will
be greater if they can also adapt those defenses based on details of a current attack
in real time. In addition to knowing an attack is occurring, details about the attacker
and their actions will help in the defense. Learning preferences of the attacker, e.g.,
they tend to attack Linux machines; attacker attitudes, e.g., they are noisy and not
cautiously avoiding detection; and patterns of behavior, e.g., the attacks occur at
certain times of day, will aid the defender in customizing strategies to adapt the
game-board and launch the optimal cyber deception.
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Since skilled cyber defenders are outnumbered by attacks, and manual responses
are too slow, adaptive defense systems are a logical technical next step. However, the
artificial intelligence that fuels these kinds of control systems are only as effective as
the feedback available such that the system can learn which automated responses had
good outcomes and which did not. Understanding what a realistic payoff or reward
function should be is a critical research question that needs to be addressed. Future
work is needed to apply the results from our Tularosa Study and propose realistic
payoffs from which an adaptive deception system can learn.
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CHAPTER 2
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
To date, there is little experimental evidence of how effective cyber deception can
be or how it may compare to other defenses. It is important for the community to
investigate and understand the usage of cyber deception and the effects it can have
to better protect information systems. To begin to measure the (positive) impact on
cyber defenders, and the (negative) impact on cyber attackers, we have focused on
decoys systems and conducted a rigorous human subjects experiment.
2.1 Cyber Deception Using Decoy Systems: Pilot Studies
This section will discuss results from initial pilot studies 1, whose results motivated
the rigorous study discussed in later sections. The goal of these pilot studies were
to evaluate a decoy system which provides realistic, lightweight decoys on a real
network to maximize the chance of an attacker being detected and mitigated quickly,
as well as delaying and disrupting an attacker’s forward progress. Several such systems
are available commercially, e.g., Canary, CyberChaff, Deception 2.0, DeceptionGrid,
Deceptions Everywhere, DECOYnet, and Threatstream, but the concept is always
the same — the large number of false assets provides an asymmetric advantage for
defenders by: 1) Reducing the chance a real asset will be attacked; 2) Distracting
an attacker from real assets and content; and 3) Forcing attackers to take additional
actions, thus slowing them down and increasing the likelihood of revealing themselves.
1This section is based on published work: K. J. Ferguson-Walter, D. S. LaFon, and T. B. Shade,
Friend or Faux: Deception for Cyber Defense, Journal of Information Warfare (JIW), vol. 16, no.
2, p. 28-42, 2017.
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We completed a series of four pilot studies which suggest that such a decoy system
can be highly effective at disrupting reconnaissance, confusing attackers by leveraging
their biases against them, causing attackers self-doubt, and increasing attackers’ cog-
nitive loads. In tests where the attacker is made aware of the deception techniques,
results indicate that the defensive effectiveness remains while confusion and paranoia
are actually increased. These pilot studies cannot be a substitute for full rigorous
experimentation. However, the pilot studies’ results, as described below, offered sci-
entific insight into the effects of deception for cyber defense and lay the groundwork
for the scientifically rigorous Tularosa study.
As a first effort to apply scientific principles to security research and provide
empirical evidence of the effectiveness of decoy system technology, we designed and
conducted a series of pilot red-team exercises following guidance from the relevant
institutional human-subject research review boards. The value of these exercises is
clear: there is a need to measure human reactions, not just network behavior. In
these pilot studies, a three-subject red team was given basic instructions to recon the
network, define its topology, and locate and exfiltrate content of interest. Since the
environment was a real operational network with real users and availability concerns,
the team was also instructed that no distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks or
other attacks that could disrupt the network were allowed. The subjects were asked
to think out loud to explain their actions, thoughts, and strategies, all of which were
recorded. A semi-structured interview questionnaire was given at the end of the day.
A data collector was assigned to each red team member to monitor responses
and ask questions for clarification. The collectors were monitored to ensure adequate
standards of administration were maintained. The research team received training
on how to collect data from the human subjects in a standardized manner. The
purpose of the training was to identify and reduce bias and primacy effects in data
collection. This helped prevent the collectors from asking leading questions and from
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allowing the subjects to veer off track; the training also facilitated the maintenance
of continuity throughout the study.
For data analysis purposes, a questionnaire was completed by the subjects, notes
were taken by the observers, the audio of subjects and observers for all experiments
were recorded, command capture of each subject on his or her laptop was obtained,
and alerting results from the decoy system were collected as was network capture on
the subnet. All four pilot studies were conducted on the same network in order to
measure the effectiveness as a defensive tool as well as the effect of deception on an
attacker. The same three professional red team members were used in all four pilot
studies, which were held roughly six months apart on the same network.
2.1.1 Pilot Study One: Cyber Unaware (Present-Uninformed)
. The goal of Study One was to evaluate whether low-fidelity decoys were robust
enough to deceive and disrupt a red team who was unaware of the deception. This
was a two-day exercise. On the first day, 71 decoy assets were present on a network
of 310 real assets. On the second day, decoys were not deployed. The subjects were
not made aware of the purpose of the experiment.
On day one (with 81% real network nodes and 19% decoy assets), the subjects
spent at least 38% of their time attempting to penetrate decoy assets. The decoy
systems detected and alerted on all scanning and exploit activity related to the decoys.
The subjects verbally expressed confusion during the scenario and questioned their
tools, their skills, and themselves rather than the authenticity of the network. For
example, one subject stated, “Are they connecting... No. ... I’m going to do it by
hand”.
The decoys were hand designed to span the spectrum of assets that might interest
an attacker, from looking more vulnerable than true assets to looking like the most
hardened and secure assets. In Pilot Study One, the subjects first investigated and
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attacked what they considered to be the most vulnerable looking assets — the decoys.
In fact, 83% of the total exploits launched were against decoy assets.
On day two (with 100% real network assets), the subjects briefly investigated
the disappearance of decoy assets, which they thought to be real. During the post-
experiment interview, the subjects stated their belief that day one was the control
experiment and that in day two a new defensive “masking” capability had been
added. Until the post-experiment debrief, the subjects believed the decoys assets
were legitimate.
This pilot study supported the hypothesis and indicated that additional benefits
of decoy systems may include:
• Improved detection of attacker activity through monitoring of scanning activity
and interaction with illegitimate network assets;
• Slowing the adversary by increasing both the number of types of network assets
and the complexity of the network;
• Encouraging changes in attacker behavior to address the increased scope, vari-
ety, and complexity of the network;
• Causing attacker confusion about the network as well as the exploit activi-
ties/successes. If an attacker does identify fakes assets on the network, he or
she might conclude the whole network is not real and leave, thereby protecting
the network.
2.1.2 Pilot Study Two: Cyber Aware (Present-Informed)
. It is often assumed that deceptive techniques can only be effective if a subject is
unaware of the deception. Pilot Study Two was designed to examine whether decoys
would still be effective if the red-team subjects were aware of the decoys’ presence on
the network. Thus, the hypothesis was as follows: using decoys to populate an existing
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network with decoy machines, routers, printers, and other devices will influence the
subject who is aware of the deception in the same manner as Study One’s hypothesis.
After Study One, the subjects were briefed on the existence of decoy systems and
the methodology of the deception without technical details. Study Two was set up to
replicate Study One, except the subjects were told to expect decoys on the network.
During Study Two, it was noted that subjects continued to fault their arsenal of
tools as well as their own skills when they did not achieve their goals. Additionally,
it was noted that they spent a significant amount of time attempting to decide for
themselves what was “false” on the network and what was “real”. The effort spent
on determining the veracity of the network nodes slowed down their intended goals
to infiltrate and attempt exfiltration from the secure network. In Study Two, when
the subjects were aware of the deception, they spent much more time before doing
anything outside the landing point provided. This means they were slower to move
and attack.
To measure the increased uncertainty or incorrect belief, subjects were asked to
label which assets were real, which were fake, and which were suspicious. Thirteen
percent of the decoys were identified as fake and 4% as real. Ten percent of real
machines were identified as fake, and 2% as suspicious. This provides evidence of
increased uncertainty since, without decoys deployed, the subjects would be certain
that every machine they touched was a real machine. Additionally, the subjects
attributed “strangeness” in the network to deception, even when deception was not
involved. As one subject voiced, “Those names sound fishy to me.... I’m not taking
any of the users ... because I don’t trust this right now”.
Many benefits of the deception being known were noted. For example, when the
subjects were unaware of the deception in Study One, they focused on attacking the
most vulnerable looking assets on the network. However, when the deception was
known in Study Two, the subjects avoided the most vulnerable looking machines,
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assuming they were put there to deceive them when, in fact, they were real. One
subject stated, “So ... legacy OS’s, right? What would be the only reason to have
one on the network?... Honeynet.”
In essence, the lack of deception awareness in Study One leveraged the subjects’
confirmation bias in that they were expecting all nodes on the network to be real.
So, when presented with decoys, subjects assumed they were real. In Study Two,
this same confirmation bias was exploited in that subjects expected unusual stimuli
in the network environment to confirm the presence of fake assets — even when they
were not fake; these stimuli confirmed to the subjects an indicator of falseness. Both
conditions leverage confirmation bias to the defenders’ advantage. Furthermore, an
awareness of deception, as in Study Two, adds to the cognitive load of the adversary
in that he or she now has to evaluate each interaction with the network to assess
its authenticity. The initial findings suggest there is great usefulness in allowing an
intruder to be aware of deception on the network to help protect true vulnerable
assets; however, more investigation is required to understand the full significance of
this effect.
2.1.3 Pilot Study Three: Psychological Deception (Absent-Informed)
. In Study Three, the adversary’s awareness of deception on the network was
further investigated by examining if simply a belief that deception was present could
provide some benefit to defenders. It was hypothesized that simply the subjects’
belief that a decoy system was on the network would influence the subjects in the
same manner as Study Two, even when no deceptive technology was deployed on the
network.
The subjects made a variety of interesting observations including many attempts
to assess the veracity of the various assets. Additionally, cognitive biases surfaced
which convinced subjects that certain nodes absolutely looked fake. As one subject
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commented, “I know that one is fake, so I am not going to bother with it”. Post-
exercise, the subjects were debriefed to assess what about the network landscape
conveyed to them that certain nodes were fake and others real.
The purpose of Study Three was to assess the effect of the subjects’ belief that
deception was deployed on the network, even when it was not. A significant amount of
the subjects’ time was spent focused on their beliefs that certain nodes were intended
to spoof them. Study Three confirmed that it might be enough for the adversary to
simply believe a deceptive defensive tool is deployed on a secure network to delay,
impede, and dissuade malicious activity. Further research is required on this topic.
2.1.4 Discussion of Pilot Studies
Pilot Study Four investigated whether the decoy system would have any effect if
the subjects knew the technical details of how it worked. This study did not have
bearing on the Tularosa study, and so will not be described here.
Based on post-experiment, semi-structured interview questionnaire results, ob-
servable data collected indicate that during Pilot Study One, subjects first ques-
tioned their tools and techniques before questioning the validity of the network. In
Pilot Studies Two and Three, when the subjects were expecting deception, they spent
a large amount of time trying to differentiate real from fake, greatly delaying and ob-
structing their exploit and exfiltrate goals. It was noted that the selection of targets
for exploitation was affected and delayed by knowledge of the presence of the de-
coy system, and attack strategies were also changed. As noted by one subject, “My
perspective is that anything that looks like an exploitable target in the network is
not a valid target”. One subject consistently and incorrectly indicated confidence in
identification of decoys, while the other subjects indicated confusion and noted that
the decoys were harder to identify than expected. The subjects’ confidence levels
were noted as extremely high when assessing a real asset as fake. These preliminary
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findings suggested that more rigorous scientific design would be useful in quantifying
subjects’ confusion, perceptions, and confidence.
For future experiments, it is crucial to continue to include observation of the sub-
jects to understand any changes/effects such as frustration or confusion. However, in
real-world applications of cyber defense, such access to the attacker, which would al-
low the researcher to observe emotional/physical reactions to defensive interventions,
is seldom possible. What can be collected is the behavior on the computer/network.
A behavioral mapping effort is critical to be able to infer human reactions of the oper-
ators from data collected on the computer. These inferences will not hold in all cases
or for all people; but with enough rigorously collected experimental data from which
to draw the inferences, these inferences could be extremely useful in determining
whether real-world defenses are having the desired effect on a real attacker.
While decoy systems are available for purchase from several cyber security ven-
dors, currently, commercial entities are hesitant to perform additional testing and
evaluation of their products for several reasons:
• This level of examination can take a great deal of time, money, and resources;
• There may be concern that the results might suggest their product works poorly
when upheld to rigorous assessment;
• There may be fear that even if their product works well, putting an exact mea-
surement of how well it works may make their product appear less competitive
compared to products whose companies are free to make marketing claims with-
out research to support their claims.
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2.2 Cyber Deception Using Decoy Systems: Tularosa Study
Based on the Pilot Studies described above, we created a large-scale rigorous
experiment2 by designing a network penetration testing exercise on a simulated com-
puter network with different conditions examining how participant performance changes
if a cyber deception techniques is used and whether the participant is aware of the
deception. We also sought to examine the attackers’ cognitive, emotional, and physi-
ological responses to the defenses, which is the human subjects portion of the study.
This information was collected to better understand when the deception is effective
(using more than just self-reports by the participants) and better correlate the impact
on the human (e.g., stress, confusion, frustration) with the technical data captured
during the penetration testing task on the network and the client.
Our Tularosa research study Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c] (held at Sandia Na-
tional Laboratory, and named after the New Mexico town of Tula Rosa) included 139
professional industry red teamers and in addition to the cyber task data collected,
the design used a range of personality indices, physiological measures, and cognitive
tests to understand attackers’ mental models, decisions, and behaviors. Each index,
measure, and test was hypothesized to correlate with performance on the network
penetration task in the presence of deceptive defenses as described in Section 2.2.1.4.
In many cases, our cognitive tests do not correspond to information that is directly
available about attackers on an individual basis in a real-world setting. However, un-
derstanding the correlations between these factors and task performance may allow
us to categorize attackers and mount a tailored response.
2This section is based on published work: K. Ferguson-Walter, T. Shade, A. Rogers, E. Niedbala,
M. Trumbo, K. Nauer, K. Divis, A. Jones, A. Combs, R. Abbott,The Tularosa Study: An Exper-
imental Design and Implementation to Quantify the Effectiveness of Cyber Deception, 52nd IEEE
Hawaii International Conference on Systems Science (HICSS), 2019.
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No decoys; Not Informed ("Control") DECOYS ADDED; Still not informed
No decoys; Informed ("Psychological") Still no decoys; NOT INFORMED
Decoys present; Not Informed ("Cyber Unaware") DECOYS REMOVED; Still not informed
Decoys present; Informed ("Cyber Aware") DECOYS REMOVED, NOT INFORMED
• •
• •
• •
• •
C1 vs C2: Does the effect of the decoys disappear when the decoys are no longer present, 
or does it persist without any indication deception techniques may be in play?
C vs D: Whether information on deception matters when 
decoys are present
D1 vs D2: Does the effect of the decoys disappear when the decoys are no longer 
present, and when indications of deception techniques are no longer given?
Two Days of Scenario-Based Penetration Testing
D1 D2
Planned Comparisons
Comparisons Between Groups: Day 1 Comparisons Within Group: Day 1 vs Day 2
A vs B: Whether information matters in the absence of 
decoys
A1 vs A2: What happens when a decoy is added (without any other indication deception 
techniques may be in play)?
A vs C: Whether decoy presence matters in the absence of 
information
B1 vs B2: After being previously told deception techniques may be in play, do these 
beliefs and behaviors persist when the warning is not given a second time?
B vs D: Whether decoy presence matters when information 
on deception is given
Participants Split into 
Four Groups: A-D
Day 1 Conditions                                                                                              
(between participants)
C1 C2
Day 2 Conditions
( within participants; changes from Day 1 in bold)
A1 A2
B1 B2
Figure 2.1: Experimental conditions. Each day, a decoy system was either present or
absent on the network. Participants were either informed or not informed that cyber
deception tools might be present on the network.
2.2.1 Design
Subjects participated in a network penetration task. Modeled after our pilot
studies Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017], we altered cyber deception, i.e., decoy system
present versus decoy system absent, and explicit mention of deception i.e., informed
versus not informed, between each group of participants on the first day of testing.
We also manipulated within participants between the first and second days of testing.
Figure 2.1 contains further details on these conditions. In addition, participants
completed a series of questionnaires and cognitive tasks (see Section 2.2.1.4).
2.2.1.1 Conditions
We pseudo-randomly assigned participants to one of the four conditions (see Fig-
ure 2.1). Participants were run in cohorts of varying numbers with all members of
a given cohort assigned to the same condition when possible, but with some cohorts
mixing conditions to achieve a balanced number of participants between conditions.
Each day, a decoy system was either present or absent on the network. Participants
were either informed or uniformed that cyber deception tools might be present on
the network. The influence of decoy presence and explicit mention of deception can
be measured between participants using performance on Day 1. Persistence of effects
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within participants, when the environment changes, can be measured by comparing
Day 1 to Day 2 within a condition. There is no control condition on Day 2 since once
participants have been exposed to the task, even with a new network, it is no longer
an independent control.
• Condition A: Day 1 No Deception (Control); Day 2 Cyber Deception.
Condition A provides a separate control condition to allow comparison between
groups of participants experiencing cyber or psychological deception and those
who do not. We also employed comparison within groups by having subjects
encounter a different type of network on the second day. The topic addressed
by adding the decoy system on Day 2 is the effect of encountering a deceptive
network following exploration of a similar non-deceptive network. This might
occur if an organization uses decoys only on a portion of their network.
• Condition B: Day 1 Psychological Deception; Day 2 No Deception.
Condition B is designed to research the effect of (between-subjects relative to
the control on Day 1) and persistence of (within-subjects across Day 1 and
Day 2) psychological deceptive influence. The decoy system is not included on
the network on either day. On Day 1, participants are informed that deceptive
defense techniques may be in use on the network. On Day 2, participants are not
explicitly told whether deceptive defense techniques are in use. This condition
aims to discover what the effect is if an attacker assumes that deception is on
the network due to acquired information and then moves to a new network with
no cyber deception.
• Condition C: Day 1 Cyber Deception; Day 2 No Deception. Condition
C allows us to examine the effect of (between-subjects relative to the control
on Day 1) and persistence of (within-subjects across Day 1 and Day 2) cyber
deceptive influence without explicit mention of deception. On both days, par-
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ticipants are not informed of the use of deceptive defense decoy techniques. On
Day 1, decoys are present on the network; on Day 2 they are not. This condition
aims to discover what the effect is if an attacker experiences cyber deception on
one network and then moves to a new network.
• Condition D: Day 1 Informed Cyber Deception; Day 2 No Deception.
Condition D is similar to Condition C, except it addresses the effect of and
persistence of cyber deceptive influence with prior awareness. A defensive decoy
system is present on the network on Day 1, and participants are informed that
deception might be present on the network. On Day 2, the decoys are no longer
present on the network. Participants are not explicitly told whether deceptive
defense techniques are still in use. This condition aims to discover what the
effect is if an attacker is aware of and experiences cyber deception on a network
and then moves to a new network without cyber deception.
2.2.1.2 Cyber Range
The Cyber Range was designed to emulate a semi-realistic enterprise network.
Each participant’s environment was also instrumented so that data could be col-
lected during the study yet not be intrusive for the participants. The simulated
enterprise environment consisted of a number of servers and workstations running
both Microsoft Windows and Linux. A wide spectrum of operating system versions
were installed. Microsoft Windows instances included various versions of clients and
servers: Windows 7 through Windows 10 clients and Windows Server 2008 through
Server 2016. Linux systems were comprised of Ubuntu 14.04 and 16.04 Desktop and
Server. See Figure 2.2 for further details.
Active Directory services were installed on a Windows Server 2016 Enterprise
system to emulate a typical corporate controlled authentication system. A DNS was
also installed to provide name services for all of the clients and servers in the network.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Windows and Linux systems.
There were also a number of other common services provided on the network such as
web servers, database servers, file servers. A total of 50 systems were installed in the
environment with an even split of 25 each for each operating system—Windows and
Linux. Twelve of the 50 were servers (6 Windows servers and 6 Linux servers). In
the cyber deception conditions (C1, D1, and A2), there were 50 decoys in addition to
these systems.
A Network Time Protocol (NTP) server was configured and installed within each
participant’s environment to provide time synchronization of all of the machines,
allowing for reliable timestamping for data collection. The NTP server was designated
as out of scope for the participants since this was part of the experimental support
infrastructure and would jeopardize the data collection effort if attacked.
To provide a more realistic environment, we created 130 domain user accounts
to provide a lived-in network appearance for the participants. Of the 130 domain
user accounts, there were 15 domain administrators to simulate the IT staff for the
fictional organization. Separate Organizational Units (OUs) were created to simulate
actual business organizations, e.g., IT, Sales, HR, Staff, since it is common to create
OUs to mirror primary business functions. A number of files were also created and
placed in the user accounts and log files were populated by having staff members
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perform activity on the network during the creation phase. For example, several
domain administrator accounts were selected and used during this phase to generate
log activity that would appear to be authentic. Each domain user account had a
password that met the minimum-security requirements. Each Windows system was
then joined to the domain to allow authentication services to work properly within
the network. The IP addresses were randomized within a typical Class C subnet and
MAC addresses were generated to represent typical vendor, e.g., Dell, HP, Intel.
The decoys used as the cyber deception component in this experiment were based
on lightweight virtualization and were configured to replicate operating system and
services of typical assets residing in an enterprise network. The decoys were configured
to mimic both Linux and Windows services similar to those in the Cyber Range.
These decoys respond to typical network port scans and provide almost identical
feedback to those of real desktops. Since actual services were not running on these
decoys, any attempt by a subject to logon failed and was logged as an indicator
of unauthorized activity. Examples of some of the services are Apache web server,
DNS, SSH, and FTP. Separate environments were designed to facilitate experimental
conditions with and without decoys. With exception of the presence or absence of
decoys, the environments were designed to be as similar as possible to allow for easy
comparative performance analysis.
We provide each subject with a laptop to use during the experiment that was
connected to the cyber range via a dedicated network. These laptops were configured
with Kali Linux which provides a robust environment for penetration testers with over
600 security-related tools. Some of the most commonly used tools in this distribution
are Nmap (port scanner), Metasploit Framework (penetration testing), and ZAP web
application security scanner. In addition, the laptops were configured with their own
oﬄine Kali Linux repository with 65 Gigabytes (GB) of binary packages that include
additional tools and software that could be easily installed by the subjects. The use of
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the oﬄine repository enabled us to disconnect the laptops from the internet (ensuring
no PII was accidentally collected) while still enabling the subject to install additional
software if needed throughout the study.
2.2.1.3 Cyber Data.
We collected several data sources from the participants’ attack clients during the
study. Netflow and tcpdump recorded full packet capture from their machines for post-
experiment review of their network activity. A keylogger and video screen capture
were used for the duration of the experiment to record their host-based operations.
Participants were encouraged to keep a running log of findings via a Mattermost chat
client during the experiment, giving real-time insight into what parts of their activities
they thought were notable as they experienced them. Additionally, we retrieved data
from the participants’ laptops after the experiment was over. Several logs from the
Kali Linux operating system were collected, including logs of the processes run, the
system notifications, daemon logs, authentication records, and default package logs.
The shells used by the participants had their history aggregated to reveal commands
entered. All notes stored by the participants on the attack client were collected as
well. If deception was present in their environment, we also collected the logs server-
side from the decoy system that tracked instances of the decoys being triggered. These
logs tracked four primary interactions with the decoys: single packets to a single host
(touch), multiple packets to a single host (probe), single packets to multiple hosts in
succession (scan), and interactive login attempts (intrusion).
2.2.1.4 Individual Measures
In addition to the network penetration task, participants completed a series of
questionnaires and cognitive tasks. This section highlights the tasks selected and
justification for their inclusion. See supplemental materials in the appendices for more
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details including the cyber task instructions (Appendix B), full schedule (Appendix
C), and all questionnaires (Appendix A).
• Task-Specific Questions. We designed three sets of questions to measure
participants’ experiences during the experiment. The questions provided a data
stream on task performance in addition to data collected directly during the
network penetration task. These questions included a daily briefing consisting
of open-ended questions about participants’ experiences during the network
penetration test, with participants in the informed condition explicitly asked
about “the nature of deception on the network, if found”. On Day 2 participants
were asked about their experience across both days and to rate tools available
to them and their prior knowledge. In addition, each day participants were
given a Cyber Task Questionnaire (CTQ) in which they were asked to rate and
explain the level of confusion, self-doubt, confidence, surprise, and frustration
they felt during the cyber exercise, with the Day 2 version including a question
about belief in the presence of deception on the network.
• General Questions about the Individual. We designed questions to mea-
sure general information about an individual such as their demographic infor-
mation and cyber security experience. These items are of particular interest
because they may help diagnose whether given effects found in the data set are
due to the experimental manipulation or a particular individual’s background
(even given random assignment to condition). They could also help explain the
factors relevant to particular performance characteristics, e.g., initial moves of
a participant with over twenty years of experience versus two years of experi-
ence. We also asked participants who experienced cyber deception to complete
a questionnaire designed to assess their responses to deception in a network
penetration context.
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• Cognitive Battery. General cognitive ability ()i.e., I.Q.) is traditionally the
best predictor of individual job performance across job categories and situa-
tions Ree and Earles [1992], Schmidt [2002]. Measurement of additional, spe-
cific cognitive abilities may provide additional predictive value in the context
of particular jobs, reflecting the specific processing required in these domains.
This includes circumstances in which initial selection on general cognitive ability
already occurs as part of an employment screening process Lubinski [2000]. Fur-
thermore, non-cognitive attributes, e.g., personality characteristics, may provide
additional predictive power Schmidt and Hunter [1998]. Therefore, the battery
for this study includes a number of tasks and questionnaires that go beyond
general cognitive ability to allow a more comprehensive understanding of the
abilities and attributes that are thought to characterize red teamers or be pre-
dictive of performance in the domain of network penetration (e.g, Campbell
et al. [2015b], Egelman and Peer [2015], Summers et al. [2013]).
Cognitive tasks included the Shipley-2 Shipley et al. [2009] as a measure of
overall cognitive ability, the Sandia Progressive Matrices (SPM; Matzen et al.
[2010]) as a measure of fluid intelligence, i.e., those aspects of intelligence that
allow for adaptive reasoning and problem solving, the Over-Claiming Ques-
tionnaire (OCQ; Paulhus et al. [2003]) as a measure of ability to distinguish
real from fictional items and decision-making confidence, the Operation Span
(O-Span; Unsworth et al. [2005]) task as a measure of working memory, i.e.,
ability to maintain information in memory and inhibit distractors, the Remote
Associates Task (RAT; Cropley [2006]) as a measure of convergent creative
thinking, i.e., generating atypical links between concepts to generate a solution
to a problem, and a set of insight and analytical problems to solve Wieth and
Burns [2006]to assess proficiency at generating incremental solutions (analyti-
cal problems) and at reframing problems and approaching them from different
34
perspectives (insight problems). Personality assessments included the Big Five
Inventory (BFI; John and Srivastava [1999]) as a measure of openness to ex-
perience, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroticism, the
General Decision-Making Style Inventory (GDMSI; Scott and Bruce [1995]) as
an indicator of the way in which individuals approach and make decisions, the
Indecisiveness Scale (IS; Rassin et al. [2007]) to determine if participants tend
toward intuitive speeded decisions or toward gathering as much information as
possible, and the Need for Cognition (NfC; Cacioppo et al. [1984]) as measure
of individuals’ tendencies to pursue and enjoy the process of thinking.
We also asked participants to complete the Karolinska Sleep Diary (KSD; A˚kerstedt
et al. [1994]) to assess sleep quality for the night prior to administration, as
some participants were required to travel prior to participation and may have
experienced sleep disturbances which could impact task performance.
• Physiological. We collected physiological data using Empatica E4 wrist-based
devices. The Empatica E4 collects heart rate information (including heart
rate variability via blood volume pulse), motion-based activity (accelerometer),
peripheral skin temperature (infrared thermopile), and galvanic skin response
(electrodermal activity sensor). Physiological signals like these have been used
to characterize and predict cognitive and physical states in a variety of settings.
Analysis of the physiological data is beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.2.2 Implementation
We received an approval on the experimental design from all relevant institutional
ethics review boards (IRB)3. No personal identifying information (PII) was collected
3The IRB determined that the portion of the tasks that aligned with normal red team activity
are not human subjects research (HSR) and thus could be included in contracted work. However,
the portion that collected data about the participants, their cognition, and their physiology is HSR
and thus was completely voluntary.
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and all experimental data was anonymized with subject IDs. No cyber task perfor-
mance or HSR information was provided back to any of the participants’ employers.
2.2.2.1 Participants
Prior to traveling to our site for the two-day study, participants were provided
the statement of work which indicated that they would be participating in a series of
capture the flag style events to measure the effectiveness of defensive software on a
simulated network. Participants could request, in advance, software tools, reference
information, e.g., technical documents, and other computer files they wished to be
included for the event. This ensured participants would have access to preferred tools
and that all participants had access to the same tools. They were aware their actions
would be monitored during the task and that they would be asked to complete a
series of reports and questionnaires. Finally, they were informed that they would be
required to sign a nondisclosure agreement stating they would not reveal information
about the task, the network vulnerabilities, and the defenses encountered (including
to other participants).
Upon arriving to the study, we asked participants whether they would also like to
be part of a human subjects research study (HSR) as part of the cyber exercise. Those
who opted in provided physiological and cognitive data in addition to the network
penetration task and task-specific questionnaires; they were offered a $25 Amazon gift
card for their participation. Six participants did not volunteer for the HSR portion.
Those who opted out wrote an extended red team report, such that participants spent
the same amount of time in the study regardless of the decision they made.
Data was collected on 138 professional red teamers, 132 of whom agreed to par-
ticipate in the HSR portion of the study. For details on the demographics of the
participants see Figure 2.3. The vast majority of our participants were male with
English as their primary language. Most were under 35 years old and had a bachelor’s
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Figure 2.3: Demographics Information
degree as their highest level of education. Responses on the experience questionnaire
indicated that participants were fairly evenly split between Linux and Windows users,
although some chose to write-in Mac or a combination of operating systems. Most
tended to work in groups of two to three people for engagements that last one to
two weeks. However, there was substantial variance in these responses. For further
details see Figure 2.4. The participants indicated the highest level of their expertise
and years of experience in cyber security, network reconnaissance, and generalized
defense practice (Figure 2.5). This is the skill set most necessary for the cyber task
presented in the Tularosa study.
As Figure 2.6 shows, over half of participants indicated their typical teams had
expertise in network reconnaissance, network penetration, host penetration, general-
ized defense practice, and incidence response, with the network reconnaissance and
penetration categories being identified by over 80% of responders. Once again, re-
verse engineering was least common, with less than 30% of participants indicating
expertise in those areas on their teams (however over 60% had access to experts in
that field).
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Figure 2.4: Experience Questionnaire: operating system, team size, and typical du-
ration of engagement.
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Figure 2.5: Experience Questionnaire responses: level of expertise, involvement in
each phase of engagement, typical engagement, and years of experience.39
Figure 2.6: Experience Questionnaire: Team composition and expert access. Expert
access was calculated as responding positively to either the team or access questions.
2.2.2.2 Cognitive Battery/Personality Assessment Findings
Following the cyber task on each day, participants completed a number of cogni-
tive tasks and personality assessments. This battery was designed to both assist in
characterizing red teamers and in controlling for performance on the network penetra-
tion task by providing measurements of cognitive abilities and personality attributes
previously considered to be predictive of performance in this domain (e.g., Camp-
bell et al. [2015b], Egelman and Peer [2015]). According to personal communication
Jones and Trumbo [2019], the cognitive battery and personality assessment results
from the original analysis Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c] have been updated and new
analysis was performed which has included seven additional participants from an ad-
ditional session that occurred while the publication was in review. Updated results
are reported here.
For all personality assessments, scores from the current work were compared
against other data sets to achieve a greater understanding of how red teamers as
a specialized population may differ from more general populations (e.g., college un-
dergraduates). For all measures, means and standard deviations from our sample and
comparison samples were calculated, as were mean difference scores, and an effect size
(Cohen’s d) was computed. Independent samples two-tailed t-tests were conducted
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Figure 2.7: Mean scores, standard deviation, and sample size for cognitive battery
and personality questionnaires. RT refers to reaction time (in seconds); POMP refers
to Percentage of Maximum Possible
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to assess any statistical differences between groups. Assumptions of normality were
not violated, however Welch’s correction for unequal variances was applied since the
sample sizes were often very different between groups.
For the General Decision-Making Style Inventory (GDMSI) and Need for Cog-
nition (NfC), our participant characteristics were compared against a sample set of
1,919 U.S. adults recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk to assess attitudes toward
privacy and security in the cyber domain Egelman and Peer [2015]. Results suggest
that for the rational subscale of the GDMSI, our sample displays a more rational deci-
sion making style relative to the comparison sample (t(143) = 4.20, p < .001). For the
avoidant subscale of the GDMSI, our sample shows a less avoidant style (t(143) = 4.97,
p < .001). For the spontaneous subscale, our sample shows a less spontaneous style
(t(143) = 2.25, p < 0.05). These results indicate that network penetration professionals
approach decision-making scenarios with a relatively high emphasis on a thorough,
more targeted, planned search for and evaluation of alternative approaches while
avoiding postponement of decision execution. An analytical and decisive approach
has been suggested in prior characterizations of this group Campbell et al. [2015b].
Results for the NfC scale suggest that our sample exhibits a higher need for
cognition than the comparison sample (t(141) = 7.77, p =< .001), indicating that
red teamers have a greater tendency than the comparison sample to pursue difficult
problems and to enjoy the process of thinking, which is consistent with what prior
interviews have implied Summers et al. [2013].
For the Indecisiveness Scale (IS), our participant results were compared against
those from 291 undergraduate students Rassin et al. [2007]. Results suggest that our
sample is less indecisive than the comparison sample (t(153) = 6.93, p < .001). These
findings support the GDMSI result of a less avoidant style of decision making and are
consistent with the notion that network penetration professionals tend to be decisive
when presented with decision situations.
42
Our participant results on the Big Five Inventory (BFI) were compared against
a dataset Srivastava et al. [2003] of 132,515 Internet users living in the United
States and Canada, aged 21-60. The sample of network penetration professionals
exhibited higher scores on Agreeableness (predilection toward trust and compliance;
t(126) = 3.92, p =< .001), Conscientiousness (level of efficiency and organization;
t(123) = 4.98, p < .001), and Neuroticism (an irritable, unhappy disposition; t(126) =
10.59, p =< .01), relative to the comparison dataset. These results are consistent with
results from our host-based cyber deception experiment Shade et al. [2020] which
utilized a different population—computer scientists, system administrators and other
computer specialists who passed a pre-screen test designed to select those with the
skills needed to perform red teaming activities. The combination of these results
may indicate that these traits of being more agreeable, more conscientious, and less
neurotic, are not unique to the Red Teaming population, but may apply to the broader
population of people with a predilection towards these types of computing profession.
However, if the pre-screen adequately selected computer specialists with skills similar
to Red Teamers (who could become good Red Teamers with proper training), it is
another plausible explanation for sharing the same traits. Although In both cases,
while the scores for the samples were slightly higher they remained within the average
range for each scale.
Similar to the approach taken for the personality data, our cognitive task data was
compared against additional data sets. Our scores on the Sandia Progressive Matrices
were compared against a sample of 171 undergraduate students for the Day 1 session
and 160 undergraduate students for the Day 2 session Clark [2014], matching groups
who answered the same subset of problems. Our scores on the Working Memory
Operation Span were compared against that of 6,236 college students (all under age
35, precluding matching of age bins from our sample; Redick et al. [2012]). A
significant effect was found on Day 1, where our sample took more time on average
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to solve problems compared to the normative set (t(183) = 2.06, p < .05). No effects
were found on Day 2.
For the Insight and Analytical Problem Solving task and the Remote Associates
Test (RAT), the average solution rates (and reaction time for the RAT) were cal-
culated based on the data of college students (see Wieth and Burns [2006] for the
Problem Solving Task; see Bowden and Jung-Beeman [2003] for the RAT) for the
subset of problems used in the current study, thereby allowing an extrapolation of
number of correctly solved problems in the data to be compared against our data.
Standard deviations were not reported for the solution rates, so the only statistical
comparison that could be attempted was on the RAT reaction time to produce correct
solutions, which yielded a small effect where the Tularosa sample was faster than the
comparison sample (t(162) = 2.04, p < .05).
No comparative dataset was available for the Karolinska Sleep Diary, so compar-
isons were not possible. However, in Figure 2.8, a trend improvement in sleep quality
was observed from Day 1 to Day 2 (paired-t(57) = 2.74, p < .01), suggesting subjects
slept more efficiently after Day 1 compared to prior to beginning the experiment,
which could be due to travel. See Figure 2.9 for a description of all significant effects
from the comparative analyses.
2.2.2.3 Procedure
Our study took place over two consecutive days with up to ten participants per
session, with sessions run between October and December 2018. Each participant
was assigned to an individual work station in the same room but divided into private,
cubicle-style spaces. A proctor was always present in the room to answer questions
and ensure participants worked independently. We attempted to group similar con-
ditions, e.g., informed, during sessions to minimize cross-contamination. Participants
worked on the same network environment within a given day, e.g., morning and af-
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Figure 2.8: Sleep Quality Question: summary statistics on responses across both
days.
Figure 2.9: Comparative Analyses: descriptive values and statistics for responses
on cognitive tasks and questionnaires. Only significant effects are reported here.
Significant differences are indicated as ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05
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ternoon on Day 1, but a new variation of the environment across days, e.g., Day 1
versus Day 2. They were given an attack laptop for the network penetration task
and an additional laptop with internet connectivity for research and the cognitive
battery. The items in the cognitive battery were either completed with printouts or
using E-Prime 3.0 software.
2.2.2.4 Scenario
When introducing the scenario in the task briefing at the start of the day, the
following was the exact wording given to explain the task:
You will conduct recon on the network and locate vulnerable services,
misconfigurations, and working exploits. Specifically, your task is to pro-
vide actionable intelligence about the company network which can be used
by the follow-on team over the next 3-6 months. Your objective is to col-
lect as much relevant information about the target network as you can in
the allotted time without compromising future network operations. There
may be deception on the network.
The underlined section was not underlined for participants; it indicates the portion
that was only provided to participants in the informed conditions.
2.2.3 Discussion
In retrospect, the task briefing was too ambiguous. It was designed to be worded
to encourage more realistic, stealthy, attacker behavior without being so specific that
it changed each participant’s natural tendencies. However, several participants in-
terpreted the instructions to “provide actionable intelligence... which can be used
by the follow-on team” as instructing them only to perform reconnaissance and not
exploitation. Interesting, many of these participants did decide to attempt exploits
in the end, in spite of this perception.
While there are cyber games and Capture the Flag (CTF) activities that occur
every year, we believe this is the largest controlled experiment which held constant
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the tools and exploits available to the attacker, the network topology and vulnerabil-
ities, and the time participants had to launch attacks. In addition, the amount and
variation of data collected is unprecedented (516 GB of data, plus an additional 1537
GB of screen capture video)4.
2.2.3.1 Design Decisions
The results of our pilot studies, described in Section 2.1, indicated that cyber
deception had a measurable impact on attacker performance, with more time spent
on decoys than real machines and self-reported confusion of which were the decoy
machines. They also investigated whether just the belief that cyber deception is in
use can negatively affect attacks. The Tularosa design is built upon the results of
those pilot studies. Many of the aspects of the experiment were kept the same, but
key changes were made to ensure a more rigorous experimental design. Other aspects
were changed due to necessity rather than a focused improvement to the methodology;
we discuss some trade-offs below.
We kept the general design similar. The four conditions in the Tularosa Study
were also present in the earlier pilot studies. However, the pilot studies used the
same red team across all conditions. Additionally, the pilot studies placed the control
condition on the second day (after the cyber deception unaware condition). This was
completed on the second day to minimize a learning effect. We felt it was important
to have a separate, true control condition that could account for any learning effects
or a priming effect (where experience with conditions that include deception or self-
doubt may build over time). To achieve that, the Tularosa Study moved from a
within-subject design to a between-subject design.
Furthermore, we updated the design to take advantage of the participants’ time
while on site by adding a second day to each condition. The second day allowed us to
4The data is currently only available for government researchers.
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better examine the persistence of cyber deception. For example, if an attacker attacks
a network in which they are affected by deception for defense, do any of the cognitive
effects, e.g., caution, frustration, suspiciousness, self-doubt, persist when they move
to a new target network (that may have no deception in use)?
Notably we made some calculated trade-offs in the design decisions for the Tu-
larosa Study that are less realistic than the pilot studies, the first being that the red
teamers were asked to work independently. During the pilot studies, it was very diffi-
cult to determine the success of any individual when he or she was working as part of
a team. This would mean looking for 30 teams per condition, rather than individuals
(or reducing the sample size). We opted for a larger sample size, trading off a degree
of realism for those used to working as part of a team or relying on another person
for specific, relevant expertise. For some participants, this may have hampered their
performance; however, it was a restriction that was distributed across all participants
and could actually mimic a team that trades off roles across different tasks or days.
The next trade-off stems from having such a large sample size in this domain.
While the Tularosa Study generally collected vastly more data than the previously
discussed pilot studies, the pilot studies did have trained observers in the room, en-
couraging participants to talk aloud during the exercise. This enabled audio recording
(and eventually text transcription with easy access to time stamps) to correlate verbal
comments expressing frustration or confusion back to the computer inputs and out-
puts at that time. This gave the research team the ability to ask for clarification and
also directly link the commands attempted and interactions with certain machines
with psychological attributes of the participant. While this was a major strength
of the pilot studies, it simply was not scalable. Additionally, with each participant
working individually, we deliberately tried to minimize any verbal discussion or ques-
tions during the study that could influence another individual’s thoughts or actions.
We had a proctor in the room at all times, noting any blatant signs of frustration
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and noting the time. Additionally we had a Red Team Report at the end of each day.
To try to get similar information that can be more easily correlated with the time
stamps of the participant interactions during the cyber task, we asked participants
to use a chat client to document their plans and progress, in real-time, during the
task. In reality, there was a wide variance in how people used this tool and how well
people followed instructions in general.
The final trade-off we will review may have caused more severe effects on the gen-
eralization of the results. The Tularosa Study was run on a fully simulated network
designed just for this study. There were no real users. There was no unexplained
messiness or policies not being followed unless designed by us. This is clearly not
realistic and may reduce the measured effectiveness, especially of the psychological
deception, where pilot studies suggest the effects of being informed of deception ben-
efit from the natural messiness present in an enterprise network.
2.2.3.2 Experimental Validity and Limitations
We considered validity concerns, including internal, external, and construct va-
lidity when designing the Tularosa Study. Internal validity was supported by using
the same proctors throughout the experiment who read from a standardized script
for instructions and responses to participant questions. Participant time on task was
cataloged and monitored throughout the session, as were breaks, and lunch. Duration
of the cyber task was controlled, as was the lunch break, for all participants. Partic-
ipants were not allowed to discuss the cyber task during breaks. Identical copies of
the cyber range were presented to all participants for a given condition, and identi-
cal machines (Kali Linux and internet-ready reference laptops). We arranged ahead
of time to include any publicly available tools requested by participants, however
no proprietary or costly tools were allowed. Additionally, a large standard set of
red teaming tools were provided. A within subjects’ component was implemented,
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whereby only cyber range deception was manipulated on Day 2. This design choice
reduced the amount of individual variability across days and conditions inherent in
between subjects’ designs.
Many aspects of the Tularosa design support external validity. Since this was a
tightly controlled laboratory study, the ecological validity could be called into ques-
tion. For example, the standard set of tools provided could have hampered the
performance of participants who were out of their comfort zones and unable to rely
on tools they regularly use. As a proxy for one aspect of ecological validity, we asked
participants to rate on a scale of 1 to 5 how they felt regarding the tools provided
to them during the experiment (Appendix A.2). The mean rating was 3.51 out of 5,
with a standard deviation of 0.93, suggesting that participants were largely satisfied
with the tool selection provided to them. Participants were provided with a popular
red teaming platform, Kali Linux, as well as internet access on a separate laptop
for research. This experiment was designed to test the behavior of red teamers, and
how this study would generalize to other populations who perform cyber attacks is
unknown at this time. We subcontracted participants through various companies in
several states around the United States, thus giving this project a broad, random
sample within the specific population of professional red teamers. That said, this
experiment was not an “in the wild” red teaming exercise, and thus proprietary tools
were not allowed, participants had to work alone rather than in groups, and had a
tightly controlled schedule. Finally, real-world cyber attack scenarios and ted team-
ing engagements typically exceed one day. Moreover, often the attacker will be the
deciding factor of how long the engagement continues, which could change dynami-
cally based on many relevant factors including interest, difficulty, and priority. We
only allowed the participants to perform the task for one day per network. This was
a monetary necessity but does diverge from the usual experience as evident in the
data collected from the participants on the usual duration of engagements.
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Construct validity is difficult to measure currently, as many planned future anal-
yses will be required to determine if the deception led to altered cyber-behavioral
performance. However, results discussed in Section 3.4 on self-reported suspicion of
deception by condition did reveal associations between the cyber deception manip-
ulation and suspicion. The data suggest an aggregate effect of the two deception
manipulations, as the Cyber Aware condition showed the largest suspicion scores,
whereas the Cyber Unaware condition produced an effect of roughly 80 percent that
of the Cyber Aware condition. These data need to be scrutinized more carefully to
disentangle the specific contributions of each of the deception manipulations.
2.3 Conclusions
Cyber deception is an inherently interdisciplinary domain. It sits at the inter-
section of computer science and the social sciences. Human behavior is at the root
of cyber offense and defense. Understanding human behavior and leveraging this
understanding for the defender’s advantage are the foundations of defensive cyber
deception. Deception techniques affect the operator behind the keyboard who is at-
tempting to complete a mission and should have a stronger and longer-lasting impact
than simply detecting or impeding attacker actions on the defended system. The
pilot studies’ results paint a picture of just how powerful deception can be for cyber
defense. The reason is simple: attackers are usually human operators. Deception is
one technique that focuses on affecting the operators themselves.
Cyber deception has been described as a “game changer” in cyber security Gart-
ner Report [2015]—one that can allow the cyber defender to leverage the home-field
advantage of owning and controlling the targeted network environment. We designed
the Tularosa Study to empirically measure the effectiveness of cyber, and psycholog-
ical, deception on an attacker’s ability to perform reconnaissance and exploitation.
While this chapter describes the experimental design, methodology, cyber range and
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participant population, in Chapter 3 we discuss the data analysis completed to pro-
vide results addressing the main hypotheses. The scale and breadth of data collected
in this controlled study will allow for further future analyses beyond those described
in thesis. Furthermore, there are many cyber defense research questions beyond cyber
deception we believe this data can help address.
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CHAPTER 3
DATA ANALYSIS
In this chapter we review the initial data analysis performed on a subset of data
collected from the Tulsarosa Study Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019c]. The analysis will
address these hypotheses:
• Hypothesis H1: Defensive cyber, and psychological, deception tools impede
attackers who seek to penetrate computer systems and infiltrate information.
To address this hypothesis we compare performance on the cyber task between
control and experimental conditions. We will compare results across all exper-
imental conditions to assess which type of deception is most effective.
• Hypothesis H2: Defensive deception tools are effective even if an attacker is
aware of their use. To address this hypothesis we compare performance on the
cyber task between conditions where participants were informed about decep-
tion to where they were not informed.
• Hypothesis H3: Defensive deception is effective even if the attacker merely
believes it may be in use, even when it is not. To address this hypothesis
we will compare performance on the cyber task between control condition and
psychological deception condition.
• Hypothesis H4: Defensive cyber, and psychological, deception causes increased
confusion, and surpsie in the attacker. To address this hypothesis we com-
pare level of cognitive effects reported between control group and experimental
conditions.
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The Tularosa dataset can address hypotheses 1–4 because it includes experimental
conditions that differ in whether cyber deception defenses are or are not present
(Absent versus Present) and whether or not participants were told deception may
be present (Informed versus Uninformed). Please note that hypothesis H5 will be
addressed in Chapter 4.
Before any of the questions of interest outlined in the hypotheses can be answered,
we must first know what constitutes success. In the cyber domain, there are multiple,
and sometimes competing, indicators of success or failure. Were subjects stealthy in
their approach? Were they able to exfiltrate the important information? Did they
appropriately identify and avoid decoy systems? Were they fast? These questions
can all be addressed to some degree by the data collected, but a notion of the level
of success will still be largely subjective.
While a subset of data was missing for various sources, excluding some participants
from specific analysis, the total number of participants who were included for this
analysis are as follows: 35 for AUPU, 28 for AIAU, 30 for PUAU, and 30 for PIAU,
for a total of 123 professional red teamers. Since this analysis focuses on the day 1
cyber data, we include participants who were allotted the standard time to complete
the cyber task.
A total of 139 participants were run through the experimental protocol in 17
different sessions. All five subjects from the first session day 10/23/2017 were excluded
due to data collection issues effecting both network and keystroke capture. All ten
subjects from session day 11/13/2017 (one of which chose to opt-out of the HSR
portion) were excluded due to a late start on the Day 1 cyber task which caused a
reduction in the allotted time. One subject who participated did not fit the selection
criteria and was excluded.
The current analysis mostly focuses on between-group comparison across the four
conditions on Day 1 to begin to address the main hypotheses. Analysis involving data
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from Day 2 remains future work. There were two participants who were no-shows
on Day 2 after participating in Day 1, and an additional seven who participated on
both days, but whose Day 2 cyber data is missing due to technical difficulties. For
these seven participants we are still able to use their self-report and cognitive data
for future analysis.
3.1 Measures of Success
There is no widely known and acceptable metric for red teamer or hacking behav-
ior. Often success if subjective and dependent on the specifics of the motivation and
the person behind the attack. Measuring success of each red teamer in the Tularosa
Study is also subjective. There are many different ways to measure success and many
additional paths that can be taken for future work. In this section we discuss metrics
for forward progress, effort wasted on decoys, and self-reported success. The follow-
ing sections address additional critical metrics including: detection evasion, altered
perception, and altered cognitive and emotional state.
3.1.1 Forward Progress
Forward progress is difficult to measure for this analysis because neither a specific
end-goal nor explicit flags were provided for participants. Allowing participants to
determine what is reportable also reveals what they perceive to be of significance. In
this respect, the Tularosa Study differs from a typical Capture The Flag (CTF) exer-
cise, where the “flags” take the form of computer files containing a specified keyword
hidden throughout the system and are thus pre-determined by the designers of the
exercise. In contrast, real-world network exploitation requires subjective valuation of
objectives and risk of exposure, which is what our study targeted. The motivation
behind this design decision is discussed in more detail in Section 5.1.4.
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One proxy for forward progress which has shown to have significant differences
across conditions is the number of keystrokes. There are many limitations in this
measurement, as it does not take in to account think-time, or that some participants
might be more productive and efficient while also typing less. However, we think this
is a reasonable measurement to support the hypothesis that we will see a difference
in forward progress across conditions since attackers cannot progress very far without
interacting with the attack client. Since the assumptions to run a parametric test were
not met because these data are non-normal, we ran the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test
which provides a non-parametric one-way analysis of variance to check for a significant
difference between conditions. While there is no statistical difference across the main
four conditions, we do see a significant difference when combining the Absent and
Present conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 2.7079, p = .015). This indicates
that the keystroke count of participants in the Absent conditions are higher than
those in the Present conditions which is consistent with the hypothesis H1 that
decoys impede and delay forward progress.
We also considered key terrain, namely the domain controller (DC). While there
was no statistically significant differences across the conditions in self-reported identi-
fication or exploitation of the DC, we do see a notable numerical difference in identifi-
cation. Participants in Present conditions successfully identified the DC less than half
the time and those in the Absent condition identified the DC more than half the time.
Only three or four participants per condition reported successfully exploiting the DC.
Interestingly, 100% of the participants in the Absent conditions who self-reported
successfully exploiting the DC also reported exfiltration of critical information from
the DC, in comparison to 50% of those in the Present conditions. It is unknown at
this time if this is a difference in forward progress or a simply a difference in reporting.
These non-significant findings are consistent with the hypothesis H1 that presence
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of decoys impedes forward progress, future work will examine the ground truth of
success as seen in the cyber data.
Our experimental design also allows us to consider different timing measurements.
For investigating forward progress, we will consider the amount of time spent before
attacking begins. While this could be caused by many different things, including
thinking about or researching something that will actually end up making the attacks
more effective, this timing analysis will just be a small portion of a bigger picture
as we consider the data analysis results. First we consider the time until the first
alert (of any type) is triggered by an interaction with a decoy. These decoy alerts are
generated by the decoys and thus only exist in the Present conditions. Decoy alerts
are the preferred alerting metric because there are no false-positives, by design, since
no legitimate users or services would be interacting with a decoy.
Since the assumptions to run a parametric test were not met because these data
are non-normal, we ran the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test to check for a significant
difference between conditions with results as follows: Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared =
4.4416, p = .035. This indicates that the Present-Uninformed condition (mean =
20.59 minutes) took a significantly longer time to initiate an interaction with a decoy
than the Present-Informed condition (mean = 11.74 minutes). While it might be
assumed that information about deception can delay an attacker by making them
think twice about what to do first, this result indicates otherwise. The data supports
the opposite theory, that knowledge about the deception can make an attacker more
aggressive and less cautious. Perhaps this behavior indicates that they are eagerly
hunting for the deception. This is likely because the information of the deception
was vague. In the Pilot Study participants were specifically told to expect decoy
systems; this information slowed down their initial actions. In the Tularosa Study
the information was simply that deception may be present which appears to have
caused participants to want to quickly seek out the details/source of said deception.
57
This change in behavior could also benefit defenders, as less cautious behavior on the
attacker’s part may lead to faster detection and mitigation by the defender.
3.1.2 Attacker Resources Expended
One important measure of the effectiveness of decoys is the level of attacker effort
directed against them. In the Tularosa Study, one key resource was the limited time
available to the attackers. The study allows us to measure time spent attacking
each host in multiple ways, as target IP addresses were captured in multiple data
streams: captured network traffic; self-reports of attacker activity (Mattermost); shell
commands entered; and unstructured notes taken, which will primary be future work.
While participants varied in the verbosity of their notes and reporting, it is primarily
the difference in interaction with real (versus decoy hosts) across conditions that
matters. In addition, the deceptive hosts logged all network interaction. Any attacker
resources expended on decoys also delays forward progress.
To investigate the question of increased effort expended in deception conditions, we
consider several different measures. First, we examine the number of commands sent
to real hosts versus decoys. We filter out shell commands that contained an IP address
and then assess whether that targeted IP address is a real or decoy machine. Then
we count the number of instances a real machine was targeted by each participant
in each condition. There were no statistically significant differences in the number of
decoys targeted across the Present conditions. However, results indicate a statistically
significant difference in the number of real machines targeted indicating that fewer
real machines were targeted in Present conditions than Absent conditions (Kruskal-
Wallis chi-squared = 4.58, p < .01). This supports hypothesis H1 that the presence
of decoys impedes forward progress and protect real machines from attack. This also
helps build a case for the technical effectiveness of decoys for defense. A total of
710 commands included decoys IP addresses, so this is a minimum baseline for the
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number of commands wasted on decoys. See Figure 3.1 for the average IP-containing
commands per participant.
Figure 3.1: Impeded Forward Progress: Average number of commands
wasted on decoys. Wasted resources demonstrates technical effectiveness of de-
coys. Significantly fewer commands with real IPs in Present condition is consistent
with decoys impeding attacker forward progress.
Next, we consider the total byte count of all the packets sent from each partic-
ipants’ host. While the results (Figure 3.2) do not indicate a significant difference
in medians among the four conditions, we note an increased variance in Present-
Uninformed is noted across many data types and may be a feature caused by the
unknown presence of decoys. This was also observed in the pilot studies where the
deception caused some cyber attackers to become more cautious and work slower, it
has the opposite effect on other participants, who become less cautious perhaps due
to frustration. A change in behavior is evident, both observationally and in the cyber
data. The increase in variance can be interpreted as indicating chaos injected into the
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performance of participants when decoys are present. This supports the hypothesis
H2 that the presence of decoys changes an attacker’s behavior, whether or not they
are aware of the deception.
Results indicate that significantly fewer bytes were sent to real machines in the
Present conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 5.28, p = .022). These bytes totaled
over 10GB and can be considered wasted attacker resources. This further displays the
technical effectiveness of decoys for defense. See Figure 3.3 for the average megabytes
per participant.
Next we discuss the number of packets sent to decoys. While number of packets
and bytes are related, they are different measures, since packets can vary widely
in size. Any packets or bytes sent to decoys is a waste of the attacker time and
resources. It also increases the risk of them exposing themselves to defenders. Figure
3.4 indicates that in the conditions where decoys were present, 35% of the packets
sent were to decoys. We see no statistical difference in number of packets sent when
comparing the Informed and Uninformed conditions. While ideally we would hope
to see 50% or more of the traffic targeting decoys (since 50% of the assets on the
network were decoys), in this experiment, the simulated network and the decoys were
not configured for maximum realism or interaction, so we would expect to see even
more packets targeting decoys in real-life scenarios.
Wasted effort can also be seen through the number of snort alerts detected refer-
encing a decoy IP (more details in Section 3.2). Any attacker activity that generated
a snort alert on a decoy is wasted effort. Notice that for the Present conditions, more
alerts are on decoys than real machines. Each Absent condition accounts for about
a quarter of the snort alerts for the four conditions (as expected). However, each
Present condition has about half the number of snort alerts on real machines than
the Absent conditions. This is a very explicit example of effort wasted on decoys since
if the decoys were not present, all of that effort is on real machines instead.
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Figure 3.2: Impeded Forward Progress: Between-group differences in total
byte count across all conditions. Results do not support a statistical differ-
ence in byte counts across conditions, but note the increase variance in the Present-
Uninformed condition.
3.1.3 Self-reported Success
To further consider success on the cyber task, we evaluated the Day 1 Red Team
Briefing requested from all participants upon completion of the cyber task on Day
1. There were several participants who either misunderstood that the briefing was
required, or decided not to complete it (as indicated by the reduced total N).
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Figure 3.3: Impeded Forward Progress: Average number of Megabytes
wasted on decoys. Wasted resources demonstrates technical effectiveness of de-
coys. Significantly fewer megabytes sent to real IPs in Present condition is consistent
with decoys impeding attacker forward progress.
In the Tularosa Study, we also directed participants to self-report vulnerabilities
they identified. Using a time-stamped Mattermost chat client, they followed a semi-
structured reporting format (to include at least the IP address of the target host)
and report all “potentially useful information about target systems on this network”.
This provides timestamped information on the thought process and beliefs of the
participants captured during the cyber penetration task (rather than only in retro-
spect). These reports allow us to compare the number of reported vulnerabilities to
the number successful exploited. This also allows us to monitor when the participant
changes their mind about the value of a target or changes their stated strategy. It
will also allow for future work examining what information the participants deemed
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Figure 3.4: Wasted Resources: Number of Packets sent to decoys. No statisti-
cal difference between Present-Informed and Present-Uninformed. Note that packets
sent to decoys can indicate wasted effort.
significant enough to transcribe into the final end-of-day report and how that related
to their real time reporting and their experimental condition.
We examined the Mattermost messages and labeled each message that referred to
an exploit as either a reported failed exploit attempt, a reported successful exploit
attempt, or an identification of a vulnerability that could be exploited. We further-
more provided that quantity of the number of new machine IPs identified in the
message, as well as the specific exploit type that was discussed. A statistical analysis
using a Kruskal-Wallis test of these results shows a trend in the self-reported exploit
successes such that the Present conditions reported fewer exploit success than the Ab-
sent conditions (p = .076), further supporting Hypothesis H1. Using the Dunn Test
for multiple comparison after running Kruskal-Wallis test for stochastic dominance
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Figure 3.5: Wasted Resources:Number of Snort alerts triggered. Number of
alerts generated per condition split by real and decoy IP addresses. Note that activity
triggering snort alerts on decoys can indicate wasted effort.
(Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.182, p = .042), we also find a trend of the Present-
Uninformed condition reporting more identified vulnerabilities that could be exploited
than the Present-Informed condition (p = .061) which is consistent with the informa-
tion about deception causing doubts about potential vulnerabilities discovered. This
supports the hypothesis H2 that being informed of the deception negatively effects
performance which could be related to increased second guessing and self-doubt (H4)
This labeling scheme does not incorporate the fact that some of the exploit at-
tempts might have been against decoys and were thus, not truly successful. Additional
analysis can be completed as part of future work to make this determination, which
(since it can only decrease the true successes in the Present conditions) can only in-
crease the significance between the difference in means between Present and Absent
conditions. While self-report data is problematic due to subjectivity and inconsisten-
cies, this can been seen as an additional indicator that the decoys impeded forward
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progress, as hypothesized in H1. Future work could be done to investigate the belief
structure of the attackers.
3.2 Evading Detection
Network penetration tests are not always focused on quiet versus loud attacker
behavior due to the attacker emulation being expected and authorized by the net-
work owners allowing access. However, these cyber professionals are often skilled at
remaining undetected since, detectability adds extra realism or purpose to the task,
and many techniques, tactics and procedures (TTPs) are learned with an understand-
ing of the various levels of noise they create. Advanced cyber defense techniques
are often focused on advanced persistent threats (APTs), which are quiet by defini-
tion—noisy attacks are easily detected, so often not persistent. To our knowledge,
little research has been done to understand loud versus stealthy attacker behavior, or
the characteristics of the attacker who performs them.
The scenario prompted the participants to attempt to avoid detection by stating:
“your objective is to collect as much relevant information about the target network
as you can in the allotted time without compromising future network operations”.
This should be their natural tendency since noisy actions such as rapidly executing
numerous probes on each host is likely to result in immediate detection and expulsion
from a network. In the Tularosa Study there is no response to detected activity for
several reasons: first, the limited time available to participants recon and exploit the
network; second, blocking participants from the network would preclude them from
further participation (reducing the amount of data collected); and third, involving
people in defending the network would add variability between participants which
would be difficult to resolve during data analysis. We, instead, retroactively determine
when each participant would have been detected by a typical intrusion detection
system (IDS).
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Built-in to the deceptive network defenses is the ability to detect and record
attacks launched against the decoys. This allows us to determine what fraction of the
attacks would have been detected in real time by the decoy system and determine
how many exploits were successful prior to that time. Another question of interest
is whether participants in the informed conditions were less aggressive, i.e., launched
fewer scans and attacks, for fear of detection.
This section is focused on the level of detectability, measured as the number
of alerts that were triggered by the participant’s activity on Day 1 in the simulated
network environment. We analyzed the raw number of snort alerts generated and also
the ratio of snort alerts divided by the number of packets sent from the participants
computer. This ratio was utilized to ensure that the results were not biased by the
various levels of forward progress made by each participant. In other words, what
percentage of attacker activity was detected?
Alerts were tracked by replaying the packet capture (PCAP) through community
rules in Snort and Suricata. We could also detect whether the alert was triggered
through interaction with a decoy or real asset in the simulated network environment.
We took the aggregate of alerts, indicating detected activity targeting either a decoy
or real asset in the simulated environment and divided that by the number of packets
sent from the participants computer to achieve a detectability ratio.
Over half of the snort alerts in the Present conditions involved decoy targets; see
Figure 3.5. For our analysis we did the typical outlier removal, removing outliers
that were three standard deviations away from the mean (subjects removed were
S51, S109, S112). This is count data with a one-tail distribution, and requires a
non-parametric approach. Since the distribution is quantitative and non-normal, we
ran the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test to check for a significant difference between
conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 8.7481, p = .033). This was followed by
pairwise comparisons using Dunn test which indicated a significant difference between
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Absent-Uninformed Absent-Informed Present-Uninformed Present-Informed
mean 550 734 973 1138
N 32 26 28 27
Table 3.1: Detectability: Means of snort alert counts across conditions.
the Absent-Uniformed (Control) condition and the Present-Informed condition (p =
0.007) supporting our hypothesis H4. Table 3.1 displays the calculated means of each
condition and the number of subjects (after outlier removal) available for this data
analysis. There was a significant difference indicated that the participants in the
Absent-Uniformed (Control) condition tended to trigger less snort alerts than those
in the Present-Informed condition (p = .026). There was also a significant difference
between the Present conditions and the Absent conditions when combined (Kruskal-
Wallis chi-squared = 6.71, p < .01), which is consistent with the hypothesis that
the presence of decoys increase the chance that an attacker reveals themselves to a
defender, which can impeded forward progress, supporting hypothesis H1.
While there was a significant difference between the Present-Informed condition
and the Control condition for raw number of snort alerts on Day 1 (Figure 3.6), this
finding was not evident when using our detectibility ratio likely due the increased
variance noted in Present conditions and discussed above. Since the number of bytes
sent is correlated to the number of packets sent, it is not surprising to see similarly
increased variance.
While there was no significant difference in the number of Snort alerts generated
with a decoy IP as the target between the Present-Informed and Present-Uninformed
conditions, we also analyzed the alerts generated by the decoys themselves. We
examined each individual type of alert the decoys generated, as well as the total of all
alerts per participant. First we removed all outliers that were above three standard
deviations from the mean (S123 for scans, S55 for probes, S88 and S93 for touch).
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Figure 3.6: Detectability: Between-group differences in number of snort
alerts triggered. Results indicate a difference in medians between Absent-
Uninformed (control) and Present-Informed conditions on Day 1 that is statistically
significant.
Since these alerts are generated by the decoys, we can only compare the Present-
Informed and Present-Uninformed conditions. We used the Kruskal-Wallis statistical
test and found significant differences across all alert types. This gives further evidence
that decoy system alerts have utility above what a standard IDS can supply.
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Recall that scan alerts are triggered on a decoy when an subject scans multiple
decoy IPs within a short time period, while probe alerts are generated when a single
decoy IP is probed for additional information. An intrusion alert for the decoy system
is triggered only in response to an interactive logon response; many exploit attempts
will trigger a probe alert instead. Both probe and intrusion alerts are triggered later
in the kill chain than touch and scan alerts. The Present-Informed condition had
significantly more touch alerts (p = .006) and scan alerts (p = .005), but fewer probe
alerts (p < .0001) than the Present-Uninformed condition (see Figure 3.7). The
Present-Informed condition having more scan alerts but fewer probe alerts is consis-
tent with hypothesis H2 and the information of deception actually further reducing
their forward progress.
Combining the alerts, we find the Present-Informed condition had significantly
more total decoy alerts overall than the Present-Uninformed condition (p < .0001).
This indicates that Information on the presence of deception reduced more aggressive
behavior towards the decoys. We suspect that this is because the informed partici-
pants are less likely to continue to interact with any asset that seems suspicious, due
to fear it may be deceptive. Intrusion alerts, which are generated by decoys after an
interactive login attempt (e.g. SSH, RDP) were also examined. While the findings for
total number of intrusion alerts (with outlier S88 removed), which are triggered by
an interactive login attempt, were not statistically significant (since only 33 out of 60
participants in Present conditions generated intrusion alerts on Day 1 ), the Present-
Uninformed condition had twice as many participants (N=22) who had at least 1
interactive login attempt on a decoy than the Present-Informed condition (N=11). A
chi-square test of independence was performed to examine the relation between con-
dition and the triggering of at least one intrusion alert. The relation between these
variables was significant (χ2 = 8.15, p = .0043). Participants in the Present-Informed
condition were less likely than those in the Present-Uninformed condition to attempt
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an interactive logon to a decoy. While in isolation this result is consistent with the
information of deception leading participant to identify and avoid it, other results,
such as the misidentificaiton of machines in Figure 3.10 counter that. Instead, we
purport that this is another indication of impeded forward progress by participants
in the Present-Informed condition, thus supporting hypotheses H1 and H2.
Figure 3.7: Impeded Forward Progress: Decoy alert triggered by partici-
pants in the Present conditions. The Present-Uninformed condition had signif-
icantly more fewer touch and scan alerts but significantly more probe and intrusion
alerts indicating that they progressed further in the cyber kill chain that the Present-
Informed condition.
There is a notable difference in the graphs of the severe and major Suricata alerts
over the course of the cyber task (Figure 3.8). While this doesn’t directly support
any of our hypotheses, it does demonstrate a difference in the pattern of cyber be-
havior across the four experimental conditions. Note there is some consistency seen
matching the previous finding in decoy alerts that the Informed conditions are more
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aggressive and trigger alerts faster. We theorize that this is a search to discover the
nature/location of the deception.
3.3 Altered Perception
The main purpose of the Tularosa experimental design is to measure the effects of
cyber deception–the most obvious being a observable difference between reality and
perception caused by the deception. While comparing perceptions to ground-truth
remains future work, we can begin to see difference in the perception of success across
the experimental conditions.
We coded the narratives written in the end-of-day briefing as Success if the partici-
pant discussed more self-perceived successes than failures, as Failure if the participant
discussed more self-perceived failures than successes, and as Neutral if the number
of failures and successes discussed were equal or (more commonly) the briefing did
not discuss failures/successes. A chi-square test of independence was performed and
indicated as statistically significant difference in the number of reported failures in
the Absent-Uninformed condition and the Present-Informed condition (χ2 = 4.49,
p = .034) and displayed in Figure 3.9. Notice that the Present-Informed condition
has half as many failures reported than the other conditions. This could be because
the combination of being informed of the deception and having deception present acts
as an excuse for the participants who no longer feel responsible for the failures and
therefore report failures less and successes more. This idea would need to be fur-
ther evaluated by looking at other metrics of self-reported failure compared to actual
failures.
Any perceived deception by the Absent-Informed condition is clearly an example
of a mismatch between perception and reality. While the data we captured did
not make it easy to observe the measurable effect that information may have had
on the Absent-Informed condition, we did see instances of blame being placed on
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(a) Absent-Uninformed (Control): Day 1 Suricata Alerts per hour.
(b) Absent-Informed: Day 1 Suricata Alerts per hour.
(c) Present-Uninformed: Day 1 Suricata Alerts per hour.
(d) Present-Informed: Day 1 Suricata Alerts per hour.
Figure 3.8: Change in Cyber Attack Behavior: Count of Suricata alerts.
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Figure 3.9: Altered Perception: Self-reported failures and successes coded
from the end-of-day briefing for day 1. Significantly fewer failures reported
in the Present-Informed condition, potentially due to attribution of failures on the
deception.
the non-existent deception, such as this excerpt from the end-of-day briefing: “This
network was filled with deception and I spent the majority of the day going down rabbit
holes that led me nowhere.” Outcomes of this study suggest that future experiments
designed to assess the effect of psychological deception (when no cyber deception
is present) should utilize a real network, or ensure that the simulated network has
enough realistic messiness, mistakes, imperfect users, and policy mismatches, such
that real things can be misattributed to deception. The simulated network for the
Tularosa Study did not include these features, and thus, did not provide evidence of
the potential effectiveness of claiming deception is present, when it is not.
The most commonly identified vulnerability reported by participants that was
designed into the simulated network as easy attack vector is a vulnerability in the
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Microsoft implementation of the Server Message Block (SMB) protocol, denoted by
entry CVE-2017-0144 in the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) catalog.
Many participants also referred to it by the Microsoft security bulletin identifier MS17-
010. EternalBlue was a well-publicized exploit at the time of this study that exploits
this vulnerability. The Mattermost reports were coded to identify when EternalBlue
was reported as successfully performed by participants. The Present conditions have
fewer EternalBlue successes reported, while the Informed conditions have fewer fail-
ures reported. Some of the decoys appeared to be vulnerable to EternalBlue. This
further supports hypothesis H1 that the decoys impeded forward progress, since a
successful EternalBlue exploit was a common tactic for progressing further in the
cyber kill chain. The Informed condition reporting fewer failed EternalBlue exploits
further supports the idea raised in Section 3.1.3 that the Informed conditions may
be, correctly or incorrectly, blaming failures on the deception, and are therefor less
likely to label/report it a failure. The results were as follows:
• Absent-Uninformed: 5 participants with a self-reported EternalBlue exploit
success; 14 reported successes; 2 failures
• Absent-Informed: 4 participants with a self-reported EternalBlue exploit suc-
cess; 15 reported successes; 1 failures
• Present-Uninformed: 3 participants with a self-reported EternalBlue exploit
success; 15 reported successes; 5 failures
• Present-Informed: 6 participants with a self-reported EternalBlue exploit suc-
cess; 8 reported successes; 0 failures
We also used the community rules for Suricata, another open source IDS, to detect
the EternalBlue exploit in the PCAP data. While it is still possible that some launches
of the exploit were missed, these results should be closer to ground truth than the
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self-reports in regards to the exploit being launched against a real machine. When
analyzed with Dunn Kruskal-Wallis multiple comparison we see a significant difference
of the Absent-Uninformed (control) condition generating more EternalBlue exploit
alerts than the Present-Informed condition (p = .050), and the Absent conditions
generating more alerts than the Present conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared =
.0697, p = .014). This further supports a decrease in forward progress in the Present
conditions. Again we see the pattern of the least number of participant making
forward progress by this metric in the Present-Informed condition. The numerical
results were as follows:
• Absent-Uninformed: 17 participants generating an EternalBlue alert; 147 alerts
generated
• Absent-Informed: 10 participants generating an EternalBlue alert; 107 alerts
generated
• Present-Uninformed: 8 participants generating an EternalBlue alert; 87 alerts
generated
• Present-Informed: 6 participants generating an EternalBlue alert; 26 alerts gen-
erated
It is worth reiterating the intrusion alert findings in this section, since attacking a
decoy is another measure of altered perception. In the Present conditions the partici-
pants often perceived that the decoys were real vulnerable machines. Unsurprisingly,
we see this even more in the Present-Uninformed condition, where due to confirma-
tion bias (discussed more in Chapter 4), participants have little reason to question
the veracity of the machines. In looking at the means of the number of intrusion
alerts in the two conditions, while not statistically significant, we see a much larger
mean in the Present-Uninformed condition caused by some outliers triggering 1000+
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intrusion alerts. The Uninformed participants are much more likely to perseverate
on a particular machine they think they should be able to exploit, even after many
failed attempts.
We also used the Mattermost self-report data to label and count the number of
individual machines that each participant misidentified, e.g., thinking a real machine
was a decoy or vice versa. This is a clear measure of perception versus reality and
demonstrates the progression of misidentification across the different conditions. This
is an important metric because incorrectly identifying a real machine as fake, can lead
to an attacker ignoring a true vulnerable target, and incorrectly identifying a decoy
as real, can lead an attacker to waste time and resources on an irrelevant target giv-
ing defenders more information about the attacker and more time to rally defenses.
There were a total of 248 misidentifications observed in the Day 1 Mattermost data
accross all conditions with 109 participants contributing Mattermost reports on Day
1. Other misidentifications, which included incorrect operating system identifications
leading to mismatched exploit attempts, as well as exploit attempts or high-value
target judgment placed on non-existent IP addresses accounted for a total of 6 of
the misidentifications, half in the Absent-Informed condition and half in the Present-
Informed condition. This is consistent with the information that deception may be
present leading to more errors by the cyber attacker. In both Present conditions, over
95% of the misidentifications were attributed to judging a decoy to be a real machine
(by determining it to be a high-value target or attempting to exploit it). Partici-
pants were not specifically asked to document which machines they thought might
be real or decoys to reduce introducing bias into the experimental design. Results
displayed in Figure 3.10) demonstrate that, again, the combination of presence of de-
coys and information about deception shows the biggest effect, supporting hypothesis
H2. There may also be a correlation between an increase in misidentifications and
increased confusion or frustration supporting hypothesis H4.
76
Figure 3.10: Perception versus Reality: Average number of machines
misidentified per participant in each condition. Results suggest that both the
presence of information and the information about the deception can effect misiden-
tification of machines. A total of 254 assets were incorrectly identified acrosss all
participants.
3.4 Cognitive and Emotional State
Next we analyzed the self-report likert scale responses provided by participants at
the end of each day at part of the Cyber Task Questionnaire (CTQ) to address how
the experimental treatment effected cognitive and emotional state. Recall that this
data is part of the Human Subjects Research (HSR) data, and thus was not collected
from participants who opted out. There was one session that started late (but still
had time to completed the cyber task), and was dismissed before participants could
finish the end-of-day questionnaires. For the analysis of the data discussed in this
section there were 120 participants data available. For analyses involving Day 2 this
was further reduce by the number of participants who did not return on Day 2. This
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information will eventually be linked to various measures of success to determine if
the cognitive state of participants effected their performance in the cyber penetration
task. This can help inform cyber defense strategies in two ways, 1) determining
usefulness of defenses causing or exacerbating a specific cognitive state, and 2) linking
metrics that are measurable in the cyber data with changes in cognitive state. These
extension remain future work.
One research question that we begin to address with the CTQ involves the partici-
pants’ belief in deception given the manipulated two independent variables: Presence
of cyber deception (absent versus present) and Information about deception (unin-
formed versus informed). Once the performance metrics are completed future work
will correlate this belief in deception with performance on the cyber task.
Responses to the belief in deception question were coded using the following rating
system: 1 = No, definitely no deception; 2 = Probably not, leaning toward no; 3 =
Unsure, equal yes/no; 4 = Probably, leaning toward yes; 5 = Yes, definitely deception.
Two raters completed the scoring, and scores were averaged across raters for analysis.
Inter-rater reliability showed satisfactory reliability for Day 1 ratings (83% agreement,
Cohen’s κ = .77). At the end of each day, participants also reported the extent to
which they felt confused, self-doubt, confident, surprised, and frustrated with the task
on scales from 1 to 5.
3.4.1 Between-Group Differences on Day 1
We consider between-group differences on Day 1 to answer the research questions
introduced in Figure 2.1 listed as Planned Comparisons Between Groups. Significant
differences were evident regarding participant belief in deception presence, as follows.
A two-by-two between-subjects ANOVA (Cyber Deception Presence: absent versus
present by information: uninformed versus informed) showed that there was a main
effect for Presence, F (1, 61) = 12.36, p < .001, where those in the Present conditions
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reported more significantly belief in deception compared (M = 3.60) to Absent (M =
2.19), p < .001. There was also a non-significant trend for information, such that those
Informed about deception tended to suspect more deception (M=3.21) compared to
those Uninformed conditions (M=2.58), p = .125. See Figure 3.11 for comparisons
between each of the four experimental conditions.
Figure 3.11: Cognitive and Emotional State: Day 1 between-group differ-
ences in belief of deception. Results suggest that both information and presence
of deception have effect. There is a significant cumulative effect of Information and
Presence, such that factual information in the presence of cyber deception instills the
greatest belief in the presence of deception.
On Day 1, participants in the Present-Informed condition reported significantly
higher confusion score than those in all other conditions (See Figure 3.12). Since
the likert scale information is ordinal and discrete, with a limited range, we ran the
non-parametric Kruskal-Wallis statistical test. This found a significant difference in
confusion with p = 0.014 and Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squared of 10.687. This was followed
by pairwise comparisons using Dunn test which indicated a significant difference be-
tween the Absent-Uniformed (Control) condition and the Present-Informed condition
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(p = 0.007) supporting our hypothesis H4. When analyzed further, we find that
both Information and Presence of deception has a significant effect on self-reported
confusion. Both the Informed participants have higher confusion (Kruskal-Wallis
chi-squared = 5.047, p = .025) compared to Uninformed and those who had decoys
Present have higher confusion (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 6.47, p = .011) than
those who had no decoys.
This further supports the findings in our host-based deception experiment Shade
et al. [2020] where we found a significant difference in the self-reported confusion
when comparing Absent-Uninformed and Present-Uninformed (which were the only
two conditions in the Moonraker Study.) Combing these results from the two separate
studies supportsH2 and the idea that the presence of cyber deception causes increased
confusion, regardless as to whether the participants are informed of the presence of
deception.
The Tularosa data also indicates significantly more self-reported surprise in the In-
formed condition compared to the Uninformed conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared
= 4.066, p = .044, Figure 3.12). This is interesting because it would be easy to as-
sume that if a participant knows to expect deception, they will be less surprised
when something unexpected happens. Instead these findings indicate that informa-
tion that deception is present can cause increased surprise, which is tangential the
findings in our Moonraker Study Shade et al. [2020] where we found significantly
more difference in the self-reported surprise when comparing Present-Uninformed to
Absent-Uninformed. The Moonraker Study design forced a more narrow path to suc-
cess than the Tularosa Study and included a different type of cyber deception; either
reason could explain the difference in findings.
The Moonraker Study results indicate a significant difference in cyber task com-
pletion rate with participants in the condition with increased confusion completing
the cyber attack task less often. Future work will determine whether the Tularosa
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data results are consistent and the condition in which we measured an increase in
confusion also shows a reduced completion rate. It has previously been assumed that
information that deception is being used should be withheld from attackers to be the
most effective. In contrast, the results discussed above match our observations in our
Pilot Study Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017] and help us further to build a case that
knowledge that deception is being used against you, can actually multiply many of
the effects since attackers start to see deception even where it is not, thus increasing
confusion and surprise above what is caused by the cyber deception.
3.4.2 Correlations Between Reported Cognitive and Emotional States
Based on our Pilot Study, frustration is an emotional state theorized to be ef-
fected by the experimental treatment. Although there was no significant difference
in self-reported frustration scores across conditions, the Day 1 correlation results are
consistent with a difference in cognitive effects across conditions that mirroring ex-
amples documented in the pilot studies. The Absent conditions showed significant
positive correlations between reporting frustration and confusion (r = .574, p < .001
for Absent-Uninformed) and r = .454, p < .05 for Present-Informed)). This could
indicate that the task itself had confusing aspects which led to frustration among par-
ticipants. Both Informed conditions showed significant positive correlations between
reporting frustration and self-doubt (r = .391, p < .05 for present and r = .583,
p < .01 for absent), and negative correlations between self-doubt and confidence
(r = −.536, p < .01 and r = −.511, p < .01 respectively). This may indicate
that information of the presence of deception (regardless of the veracity of the state-
ment) can cause self-doubt to the participant, which affects confidence. Both Present
conditions showed significant positive correlations between reporting frustration and
surprise (r = .563, p < .01 for uninformed and r = .708, p < .001 for informed),
as well as self-doubt and confusion (r = .535, p < .01 for uninformed and r = .381,
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p < .05 for informed), indicating that cyber deception may cause a cyber attacker
surprise, and confusion about the network may lead to increased self-doubt when at-
tacking. In the Present-Uninformed, suspicion of deception was negatively correlated
with self-doubt (r = −.535, p < .05), mirroring what was discovered in the pilot stud-
ies Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017]; participants could be attributing task performance
to feelings of inadequacy instead of to deception deployed on the network. However,
in the Present-Informed condition, a positive correlation was observed with confidence
(r = .490, p < .05), which could be reflecting the fact that since they were informed,
and likely found deception evident on the network, they felt confident in their ability
to negotiate it. In fact, an opposite, though marginal, effect was observed in the
Absent-Informed condition, suggesting that being informed about deception but not
finding anything on the network to support that claim resulted in less confidence
about the attack strategy.
3.4.3 Within-Group Differences Between Days.
We also looked at the within-group differences by examining the change in self-
reported cognitive and emotional state from Day 1 to Day 2. While there was not a
significant different in self-reported frustration between-groups on Day 1, the change
in self-reported frustration on Day 2 shows a significantly higher amount of frustra-
tion in the AUPU condition than the other conditions (Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared
= 10.526, p = .015). The condition changing from Absent-Uninformed (Control) on
Day 1 to Present-Uninformed on Day 2 showed increased frustration while the other
conditions changing from psychological and/or cyber deception to Absent-Unaware
on Day 2 indicated reduced frustration. The difference between self-reported frus-
tration between Day 1 and Day 2 was significant when comparing AUPU to AIAU
(p = .025), to PIAU (p = .025), and to PUAU (p = .043). We believe this difference
is caused by the addition of decoys for this condition on Day 2. We see a decrease in
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the other conditions from Day 1 to Day 2 due to a learning effect and an absence of
decoys on Day 2. The other conditions have no decoys present in Day 2 and tend to
report less frustration than Day 1.
In addition, the change in self-reported surprise from Day 1 to Day 2 showed a
trend with Kruskal-Wallis chi-squared = 7.2963, and p = .063 between the AUPU
condition and both the Informed conditions (AIAU, p = .074 and PIAU, p = .068).
With the addition of decoys on Day 2 the AUPU condition reported increased surprise,
while the conditions that were informed on Day 1 showed a decrease in surprise on
Day 2.
Frustration has been shown to reduce effectiveness of cyber operators Dykstra and
Paul [2018], as well as other stressors like fatigue and increased cognitive workload.
While confusion and surprise was not included (since they are seldom factors without
deception present), we believe that they will have similar effects to frustration and
other types of stress. This related work focused on measuring and reducing stress to
improve cyber operator performance supports our hypothesis that using deception to
increase stress can reduce the effectiveness of cyber operators.
3.4.4 Word Count Analysis
In this section we discuss the results and implications of a word count analysis
performed on the self report data. To better scope the results to align with the other
findings discussed in this chapter, we focus on day 1 self-reports only. For each par-
ticipant this includes all Mattermost reporting from Day 1 and the Day 1 end-of-day
Red Team Briefing. It is important to note that there was no significant difference in
the number of Mattermost messages across conditions. Figures 3.17 and 3.18 display
a word cloud showing the most frequent words for all participants across all condi-
tions from the Mattermost chat logs and Red Team Briefing for Day 1, respectively.
These two different types of reports tended to provide different types of information.
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The real-time Mattermost chat logs are where we can observe mistakes being made,
remade, and corrected, the reasoning behind actions, frustrations and their causes.
The end-of-day Red Team Briefing is where we tend to observe a summary of the
strategy taken, as well as final outcomes and details of only the most memorable suc-
cesses, failures, and frustrations. The differences between the types of reports can be
seen in the difference Word Clouds. For example, notice the term deception appears
in the end-of-day word cloud, but not the real-time word cloud, suggesting that this
is something participants reasoned about retrospectively.
Upon cursory review of word counts, we selected keywords of interest which seemed
to have many occurrences. We then considered the root of these words, and noted
other versions and spelling that would need to be grouped with the root. For example,
one root word of interest is deception, and when we counted for deception we included:
deceive, deceptor, deceptive, decoy, deceit, deception(s), and honeyX (where X allows
us to count honeypot(s), honeynet(s), etc.). The root words selected were: decep-
tion, confusion, difficult, easy, failure, success, frustration, interesting, real, unable,
exploit. The results are from a binary indication of whether a participant used a term
relating to the root word in any messages for that day. As elsewhere in this chap-
ter, we use the Kruskal-Wallis statistical test to compare across conditions. When
comparing more than two conditions performed post-hoc pairwise comparisons using
Dunn (1964) Kruskal-Wallis multiple comparisons with p-values adjusted with the
Benjamini-Hochberg method. Notable findings are described in Table 3.2.
Statistical differences and trends for the keyword of Deception on Day 1 align
with the coded CTQ responses on suspicion of deception, discussed above, that the
Present-Informed condition had the most belief that deception is present, and the
Absent-Uniformed the least. They also align with the self-reported likert scores for
confusion indicating that Present-Informed had the most confusion. These findings
supports the idea that keyword counts can provide us with useful information for
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concepts that may have not been directly address in the questionnaires. Word counts
alone are likely not a strong enough indicator to confirm a hypothesis, but when
grouped together to further confirm other results, they can be a powerful enhancement
to further the narrative.
Success is mentioned significantly more for participants in the Present conditions
(p = .004). This supports the hypothesis that the decoys are providing an easy target,
and giving participants a false sense of success.
Another finding indicated that Real is mentioned significantly more for partic-
ipants in the Informed conditions (p = .026). This is likely due to the informed
participant taking the time to question, investigate, and report on what they per-
ceive as real or fake. This supports the hypothesis that information about deception,
even when it isn’t really there, can distract (and thus delay) attackers from their true
goal (which is not to determine real from fake).
We also note a non-significant trend that Easy is mentioned significantly more for
participants in the Uninformed conditions (p = .051). This could further support the
idea that psychological deception makes the task harder for participants, regardless
as to whether cyber deception is actually present. Based on observations from the
Pilot, this could be due to increase self-doubt and paranoia both in the case when
the deception is really present and when it isn’t.
3.5 Discussion of Data Analysis Results
In this chapter we discussed results from the data analysis that has been performed
on the cyber data collected from the Tularosa Study. This analysis is focused on the
cyber data and self-reports and only examines the conditions on Day 1 (unless oth-
erwise stated). We do not examine the cognitive battery, the physiological measures,
or fully evaluate persistence effects evident on Day 2. This is left for future work.
A collection of all the significant findings discussed above can be seen in Table 3.3.
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Root Term Higher Lower p-value
Deception Present-Informed
Absent-Uninformed
Present-Uninformed
p = .00005***
p = .0005***
Deception Informed Uninformed p ¡ .001***
Deception Absent Present p = .032*
Deception Absent-Informed Absent-Uninformed p = .068
Deception Present-Informed Absent-Informed p = .056
Confusion Present-Informed
Absent-Uninformed
Absent-Informed
Present-Uninformed
p = .001**
p = .001**
p = .016*
Confusion Present Absent p = .002**
Success Present-Informed Absent-Uninformed p = .044*
Success Present Absent p = .012*
Success Present-Informed Absent-Informed p = .057
Real Informed Uninformed p = .026*
Exploit Informed Uninformed p = .076
Table 3.2: Word Count Analysis: Notable differences in number of subjects
per condition having a self-report containing keywords on Day 1. Significant
differences are indicated as ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05.
Since our data is mostly non-normal, non-parametric test were usually used, which
can have a lower power. Most notably the results are consistent with:
• H1: Presence of decoys cause delays in forward progress and increases detection.
• H2: A combination of the presence of deception and the knowledge that it is in
use has the largest effect on cyber behavior and can cause increased confusion
and surprise.
• H4: Information that deception might be present can effect the attackers cog-
nitive state, decisions, and behavior.
While the results presented do not provide a strong argument Hypothesis H3 – the
value of providing information that deception might be present when it is actually ab-
sent, based on observations and previous pilots, we still think this is a valuable concept
for future research. The nature of the simulated network range used for the Tularosa
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Study, did not have enough of the natural messiness provided by a real network with
real users. We argue that this messiness is precisely what is needed to provide the
plausible deniability and uncertainty that make the psychological deception effective.
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Hypothesis H1:
Data Source Higher Mean Lower Mean p-value
Keystroke Count Absent Present p < .05*
Commands w/ real IPs Absent Present p < .001**
Bytes to real IPs Absent Present p < .05*
Snort Alert Count Present Absent p < .01**
EternalBlue Alerts Absent Present p < .05*
Reported Exploit Successes Absent Present p = .076 ns
Hypothesis H2:
Data Source Higher Mean Lower Mean p-value
Self-reported Confusion Present-Informed Absent-Uninformed p < .01**
Snort Alert Count Present-Informed Absent-Uninformed p < .05*
Time to first decoy alert Present-Uninformed Present-Informed p < .05*
Decoy Touch Alerts Present-Informed Present-Uninformed p < .01**
Decoy Scan Alerts Present-Informed Present-Uninformed p < .01**
Decoy Probe Alerts Present-Uninformed Present-Informed p < .001***
# with Intrusion Alert Present-Uninformed Present-Informed p < .01**
All Decoy Alerts Present-Informed Present-Uninformed p < .001***
EternalBlue Alerts Absent-Uninformed Present-Informed p < .05*
Reported # of vulnerabilities Absent-Uninformed Present-Informed p = .061 ns
Hypothesis H4:
Data Source Higher Mean Lower Mean p-value
Self-reported Surprise Informed Uninformed p < .05*
Self-reported Confusion Informed Uninformed p < .05*
Self-reported Confusion Present Absent p < .05*
Suspicion of Deception Present-Informed Absent-Uninformed p < .01**
Self-reported frustration
change score across days
AUPU
AIAU
PIAU
PUAU
p < .05*
p < .05*
p < .05*
Table 3.3: Summary of significant findings. Significant differences are indicated
as ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, ns for a non-significant trend.
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Figure 3.12: Cognitive State: Day 1 self-reported cognitive and emotional
state. This is self-reported data provided at the end of day 1 indicates that the
Present-Informed condition had significantly more surprise than the control condition
(Absent-Uniformed) and significantly more confusion than all other conditions.
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Correlations Between Variables for AUPU Condition on Day 1
Confusion Self-Doubt Confidence Surprise Frustration Deception
1.  Confusion —
2.  Self-Doubt .245 —
3.  Confidence -.050 -.317 —
4.  Surprise .339 .471** -.230 —
5.  Frustration .574*** .115 -.047 .271 —
6.  Deception .553 -.159 -.334 .351 .061 —
Note.  p < .05* p < .01** p < .001***. Significant relationships are shaded for ease of viewing.
TSQ Preliminary Results: Absent-Uniformed Condition
Figure 3.13: Day 1 correlations between self-reported cognitive states for
Absent-Uninformed (control). Notable results suggest that in the Absent-
Uninformed condition frustration is related to confusion and surprise is related to
self-doubt.
90
Correlations Between Variables for AIAU Condition on Day 1
Confusion Self-Doubt Confidence Surprise Frustration Deception
1.  Confusion —
2.  Self-Doubt .312 —
3.  Confidence -.514** -.511** —
4.  Surprise .472** -.111 -.170 —
5.  Frustration .198 .583** -.199 .189 —
6.  Deception .256 .146 -.449 .095 .285 —
Note.  p < .05* p < .01** p < .001***. Significant relationships are shaded for ease of viewing.
TSQ Preliminary Results: Absent-Informed Condition
Figure 3.14: Day 1 correlations between self-reported cognitive states for
Absent-Informed. Notable results suggest that in the Absent-Informed condition
frustration is related to self-doubt, lack of confidence is related to confusion and
self-doubt, and confusion is related to surprise.
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Correlations Between Variables for PUAU Condition on Day 1
Confusion Self-Doubt Confidence Surprise Frustration Deception
1.  Confusion —
2.  Self-Doubt .535** —
3.  Confidence -.236 -.240 —
4.  Surprise .016 .197 -.424* —
5.  Frustration .338 .376 -.565** .563** —
6.  Deception -.454 -.535* .038 -.048 .069 —
Note.  p < .05* p < .01** p < .001***. Significant relationships are shaded for ease of viewing.
TSQ Preliminary Results: Present-Uninformed Condition
Figure 3.15: Day 1 correlations between self-reported cognitive states for
Present-Uninformed. Notable results suggest that in the Present-Uninformed con-
dition frustration is related to lack of confidence and surprise and confusion is related
to self-doubt.
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Correlations Between Variables for PIAU Condition on Day 1
Confusion Self-Doubt Confidence Surprise Frustration Deception
1.  Confusion —
2.  Self-Doubt .381* —
3.  Confidence -.244 -.536** —
4.  Surprise .292 .337 -.166 —
5.  Frustration .454* .391* -.265 .708*** —
6.  Deception -.070 -.211 .490* -.086 -.187 —
Note.  p < .05* p < .01** p < .001***. Significant relationships are shaded for ease of viewing.
TSQ Preliminary Results: Present-Informed Condition
Figure 3.16: Day 1 correlations between self-reported cognitive states for
Present-Informed. Notable results suggest that in the Present-Informed condition
frustration is related to surprise, and lack of confidence is related to self-doubt.
Figure 3.17: Word Cloud: Displaying the top 150 frequent words across all
conditions used in Mattermost reporting on day 1.
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Figure 3.18: Word Cloud: Displaying the top 150 frequent words across all
conditions used in end-of-day reporting on day 1.
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CHAPTER 4
OPPOSITIONAL HUMAN FACTORS
Oppositional Human Factors (OHF)1 is a new concept we introduced as the sci-
ence of reversing traditional human factors and usability recommendations to make
interaction with technology difficult for those with malicious intent. Inverting human
factors can aid in cyber defense by flipping well-known guidelines and using them to
degrade and disrupt the performance of a cyber attacker Gutzwiller et al. [2018].
There has been significant research on how cyber defenders currently perform tasks
and how information should be presented to operators, cyber defenders, and analysts
to make them more efficient and more effective. However, we can actually create
these situations just as easily as we can mitigate them.
Oppositional human factors are a new way to apply well-known research on hu-
man factors to disrupt potential cyber attackers and provide much-needed asymmetric
benefits to the defender. We will introduce preliminary experimental findings that
provide new evidence of traditional attentional and decision-making biases present
in red teamer behaviors. For example, well-known biases such as confirmation bias
may disrupt red team decisions and goals, and simultaneously increase their risk of
detection. Disrupting attention and decision making are two conceptual components
we will describe in a growing OHF framework for cyber defense. We note that oppo-
sitional human factors compliment cyber deception practices and, in some cases, go
beyond what would traditionally be defined as “deception” because the techniques
1This chapter is based on published work: R. Gutzwiller, K. Ferguson-Walter, S. Fugate, and A.
Rogers, “Oh, Look, A Butterfly!” A Framework for Distraction Attacker to Improve Cyber Defense,
Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES), 2018.
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can disrupt the thought processes, work processes, and mental state of attackers in
novel ways and can have long-lasting and dramatic effects on the ability to successfully
attack networks.
4.1 Oppositional Use of Human Factors
In conducting a cyber attack, operators may multitask when any two or more
demands for their attention occur at the same time. Simultaneous mental demands
emerge when multi-tasking and create mental resource interference Arrington and
Logan [2005]. One could force an attacker to incur this kind of interference by en-
gineering each task in the environment to impose loading of the same resource, e.g.,
overloading the auditory or visual channel. In this way any tasks that are normally
separated in time could be made to happen at the same time, forcing these additional
attentional costs which can be predicted explicitly by the multiple resource theory
model of attention Wickens [2008]. Using the model “in reverse,” we would actually
seek to increase the interference of sets of tasks rather than decrease it.
As a simple example which addresses oppositional human factors in the context of
existing defense techniques, an attacker who scans a network containing decoys will
be faced with the tasks of assessing vulnerabilities in a larger number of potentially
vulnerable systems. However, even if the number of decoys is large, this multitasking
task, e.g., running a large number of banner-grabbing scripts, is unlikely to present a
significant cognitive burden. If, however, our systems respond inconsistently, provide
corrupted responses, or provide responses which change over time, an attacker is more
likely to forego automated or scripted interactions and revert to manual instance-by-
instance tests. Such an approach has many implications, but of interest here is the
potential for the attacker to intentionally choose to manually perform multiple simul-
taneous actions, potentially overloading available cognitive resources and certainly
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wasting some time interacting and validating vulnerability scans of systems which
are specifically intended to increase attacker cost.
Not all cyber attackers work in the realm of multiple task performance, where mul-
tiple resource theory predictions hold. And often, to deal with multiple co-occurring
tasks, human operators attempt to separate tasks and then switch rapidly between
them, leading to more sequential information processing Salvucci and Taatgen [2011]
as human attention appears limited by a single channel Liao and Moray [1993]. These
task switches are costly when they are forced Kiesel et al. [2010], Monsell [2003], but
also when they are made under voluntary control Arrington and Logan [2005], which
requires the attacker to make on-the-fly judgments about where to allocate attention.
These conditions also often lead to cognitive tunneling, a phenomena in which an
operator becomes fixated on one ongoing task in the milieu e.g., diagnosing why a
landing gear may be malfunctioning, and ignores or forgets to monitor and do work in
others, even when they are important e.g., ensuring the plane is at a stable altitude.
By inverting guidance on avoiding cognitive tunneling, we may be able to force the
attacker to tunnel into worthless tasks by making them seem interesting or important
— or at the very least disrupt attention if attacker focus is on tasks that progress the
attack.
For example, a decoy system’s purpose might be to allow an attacker to begin
downloading a large file but then to degrade or to cease this file transfer when the
attacker begins interacting with other, more valuable, information systems. The
opportunity costs associated with initiating interaction with a new, unknown system
versus the “known” value of the existing file transfer is likely to lead the attacker into
tunneling into the task of determining the reason for the “high value” file transfer
failure.
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4.2 Attackers Exhibit Framing and Attentional Tunneling
Analysis of transcripts from our pilot studies suggest that many forms of cognitive
bias were present and that the use of deception played an important role in creating
bias where there would not have been bias otherwise. We have spent some time
attempting to deconstruct these transcripts in respect to various cognitive bias effects,
both attentional effects and decision making biases. While it can be difficult to
precisely identify actual effects or to properly identify which form of bias is present
due to deception (if any) we believe that it is worthwhile to examine several key
examples.
When deception was present and the participants were not informed of the decep-
tion, the red team participants seemed to have a tendency to blame themselves for
perceived discrepancies. This can be viewed as an illusion of control bias, where a
perceived good outcome based on a poor decision can induce a false feeling of control
over the situation Langer and Roth [1975].
Red Team Member A (RT-A): “That did not work. Very dis-
appointed. That is a very stable exploit. Very well known. Very well
documented. I really thought I had something there, although while I’m
at it... if we had one SP 0...”
Red Team Member B (RT-B): “Try another exploit at it.”
Red Team Member A RT-A: “I might have done something dumb.
Hold on.”
In this exchange RT-A blames themselves when a well-known and stable exploit
fails to work. Once the red team was informed of the use of deception, in future
studies, they tended to make very different assessments from nearly identical behavior
of systems on the network. In the not informed condition they simply move on
to other systems or other exploits. However, in the informed condition they spend
significant amounts of time attempting to find indicators that systems are real or fake.
This suggests a framing effect, where people exhibit changes in behavior or decision
making associated with the way a problem or situation is described, even though
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the underlying environment is still the same Tversky and Kahneman [1981], which
then appears to lead to the presence of attentional tunneling. The framing effect is all
about how people view information: Windows XP Service Pack 0 originally framed as
gain by the red teamers, as they are vulnerable, however once informed of deception
this was framed as potential loss, assuming that vulnerable appearance indicates a
decoy that will lead to detection.
Other examples from this study’s transcripts also suggest that there may also be
aspects of other cognitive bias effects. In particular, the following exchange is telling:
RT-A: “Very well. Very well cloaked, I got to tell you... I’m very
impressed with this one because I know for a fact that that [user name]
is not valid because it does not show up in the infrastructure. So I use
that script to automate the process of validating all my user names and
so I know it’s fake, and so I connected to the machine and I’m greeted
with what looks correct. It looks like any other Windows 7 client machine
including the proper greeting.”
RT-B: “Let me, let me finish poking and prodding at these servers that
I know are fake.”
At this point the red team members have a potentially valid suspicion that the sys-
tem is a decoy. However, the machine is real and the user name is actually valid. This
is an example of the anchoring bias—the tendency to rely too heavily and “anchor”
to one trait or piece of information when making decisions during the task Tversky
and Kahneman [1974]. The participant is relying to heavily on the information given
at the start of the study that deception might be present, and continues to insist the
machine is a really impressive fake instead of real. We also observed many instances
where red team confidence in a system being fake increased throughout the day even
when no additional evidence was available. This is a clear example of irrational es-
calation, gradually increasing their estimation of the correctness of a judgment based
on incomplete and insufficient evidence.
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Sunk-cost fallacy effects, wherein people justify increased investment of time or
effort based on ongoing prior investment in spite of new evidence (available to the par-
ticipant) suggesting that the decision was probably wrong Arkes and Blumer [1985],
may in some cases have led to other tunneling effects, as seen in the example below.
There were several instances where the red team participants would continue to re-
turn to discussions and analysis of hosts that were suspected to be fake. In some
cases they accurately assessed a system as fake but continued throughout the day to
re-assess their own judgment. This behavior is not in line with the explicit goal given
to exploit and exile the system, and is instead a distraction from that goal.
RT-A: “And we had a collection of reasons for our suspicion. Strike
one, as one of our team members had noted, was that for the [user name]
it is very difficult for somebody to have a last name that’s made out only
of consonants. So that was strike one against that thing. Strike two: in
one of our collection notes we found this thing had a different IP address.
Now it has another IP address. Not necessarily a strike against it, but
looks interesting. And then strike three was, this particular kind of scan
gathers more information after negotiating with that unit, with that piece
of equipment, and it came back with MYGROUP unknown, looked very
suspicious. So I want to gather that same information...”
Each of these examples from our pilot studies support our claim that the use of
deception is likely to create new opportunities for causing cognitive bias in attackers to
aid cyber defense. The cognitive bias effects which were observed were not specifically
intended in the design of the decoy systems. In other words, these effects were not
the intent of the decoy system’s design, but they could be. If such a decoy system
designs were using oppositional human factors guidelines, each of these effects (and
others) could be leveraged for maximum effect using all of the tools and measures
available.
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4.3 Attackers Exhibit Confirmation and Anchoring Biases
In the pilot studies, red teamers were asked to exfiltrate data as a primary task.
One of the subtasks that attackers engage in is determining whether hosts are real
or fake. Shifting emphasis to this decoy identification makes some sense from the
perspective of an attacker, especially one who is told that deception is present. Effort
expended early in determining which machines are decoys might save time later, if
they are able to learn to accurately distinguish decoys from real systems. But it also
suggests that if a real system appears to be a decoy, due to a particular misleading
but distinguishing characteristics, this same effort may be beneficial for cyber defense,
biasing attackers away from real systems. Further benefit to cyber defenders stems
from delaying or causing attackers to reveal themselves by increasing their noise or
luring them to interact with decoys.2
A take-the-best heuristic strategy, wherein an attacker notes the most salient and
accurate characteristics to distinguish real from fake, may be useful precisely because
it is fast and accurate (mostly, but not always). Still this heuristic must be developed
over time and exposure, and attackers may not get the amount of feedback necessary
to build this heuristic, or the feedback may be delayed enough that it does not help
long-term. Unrelated characteristics of machines might be observed by the attacker,
labeled as indicating either real or decoy systems, and then used to inaccurately
identify real systems as decoys. The removal of feedback both in confirming a system
is truly real, and in the lack of executing certain defensive behaviors against an
attacker, may be a good thing at times as it slows the skill acquisition of the attacker.
We found several examples of red team members suffering from confirmation bias,
the tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a way
2This section is based on published work: R. Gutzwiller, K. Ferguson-Walter, and S. Fugate, Are
Cyber Attackers Thinking, Fast and Slow? Evidence for Cognitive Biases in Red Teamers Reveals
a Method for Disruption , Human Factors and Ergonomics Society (HFES), 2019 Gutzwiller et al.
[2019].
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that confirms one’s preconceptions Einhorn and Hogarth [1978], when making host
determinations. They anchored or fixated on their initial suspicions about hosts and
sought to confirm these findings e.g., all the real hosts look like X, all the fake hosts
look like Y, and the determination is made in confirmation of prior knowledge.
For example, a red team used a corporate employee directory to check hostnames
as part of their attempt to determine real from fake. Attackers believed — incorrectly
— host names were based on a “first.lastname” naming convention. Using the corpo-
rate directory would be a reliable way to determine fake versus real hosts. However,
it only confirmed their hypotheses, and was not reliable in this case.
Once the red team determined a host was fake they also continued looking for more
evidence to confirm this, including examination of whether the font was different
between what they believed were fake versus real hosts. They also believed that
connection timing was a differentiating factor.
When told deception may be present, some participants went further in noting
how a host was suspicious due to a variety of other factors, including (1) the last name
was made of only consonants and, assuming host names are real people’s names, it
was reported as odd, (2) the host had a different IP address than earlier attacker notes
listed, and (3) the output from various network scan showing UNKNOWN made them
suspicious, even though this can happen with real machines and operating systems.
The assessment process of real versus fake hosts was particularly interesting in the
pilot study in which there were no fake machines. Attackers were told there might
be deception, but ignored or failed to search for evidence pointing to machines being
real, instead searching and finding evidence that could be used to suggest a host is
fake. In examples provided above, because of various suspicions, a host became a
target for the red team to determine it was fake and the secondary task overtook the
primary task of data exfiltration. In this case the host was real, not fake, therefore,
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not only were the attackers tricked at the identification stage, but they spent more
time investigating the host for the express purpose of labeling it as a decoy.
In our analyses, attackers also developed uncertainty when they were told that
deception was present. A form of anchoring bias appears in the examples above but
is even clearer below. When the red team was told that deception may be present,
they treated the results of the directory comparison as “truth”. Some participants
became highly certain of their particular divination of real from fake — as in the
lookup of identified machines in corporate directories and cross-referencing names.
One subject was completely confident that the lookup was an accurate measure and
proceeded to focus significant energy on the machines deemed to be fake, in spite
of the stated goal: to exploit real machines. The anchoring bias — fixation on the
lookup methods — suffered by attackers seemed to lead to tunneling behaviors on
determining real from fake hosts. Together, these biases result in a belief in false
knowledge and a tendency to forego useful work in lieu of further hypothesis testing.
With enough time in such a situation, the attacker may eventually care less about
correctly identifying machines, but this also benefits the defender. This bias was
something the red teamers noticed and acknowledged, but were still effected by, as
evident by this answer to a post-exercise question about how knowledge of deception
changed their strategy.
RT-A: “I think that right off the bat we were swayed to that being
one of our very first tasks — identify what we think is real, compare and
contrast assets [...] instead of just targeting the most interesting assets,
we actually spent time comparing them.”
4.4 Biases of Cyber Attackers
In the current analysis of data from the pilot studies, we found evidence that cyber
attackers exhibit classic attentional and decision-making biases. As discussed, we have
also found evidence for many biases, take-the-best heuristics and other illusions that
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may lead attackers astray, but more biases are likely at play. There are many biases
which could play important roles in achieving OHF effects, though we suggest caution
in assuming all have bearing on cybersecurity.
The ever-changing nature of technology may drastically change the tasks of cyber
attackers. Even the differences between deep-state actors versus “script kiddies” are
large enough that some types of biases may exist in one of the populations and not
in the other. This deserves more study.
We believe we can exploit these behaviors for the betterment of cyber defense
as part of an OHF strategy, and in combination with decoy usage. Understanding
attention allocation and decision-making related to malicious activity is potentially
only a few elements of an OHF toolkit for cyber defense. The ability to predict how
humans behave in the case of exhibiting bias may also help discriminate between
actors.
Finally, one could view cyber deception as a form of OHF as well, because a
normal working assumption of interaction with an IT system is that it is truthful and
transparent about its operations. Deception violates usability guidelines by (usually)
hiding goals and states of the system from its users. A key assumption applies for
many of the various attention and decision making OHF techniques discussed above:
a defender or defensive system has the ability to control what a would-be attacker
will be able to view.
Current computing systems tend to freely share and to even broadcast computing
system information such as TCP port status, the existence and version of running
services, operating system information, and a plethora of other forms of technical
data useful for auto-configuration and interconnectivity between systems and services.
Each of these information sources could be easily manipulated by a clever defender to
mask true system state and behaviors to manipulate attacker knowledge of network
and system state. Such manipulations would likely be key tools for manipulating
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attacker biases, particularly if they can be demonstrated to be empirically effective
via experimentation.
Lastly, an astute reader may wonder if examining and gaining a comprehensive
understanding of attacker cognitive biases might eventually lead to attackers learn-
ing how to better address and suppress their own biases — thereby diminishing or
removing the intended defensive effects of OHF techniques. However, people exhibit
bias blind spots Ehrlinger et al. [2005], Pronin et al. [2002], and a key characteristic
of many bias effects is their tenacity: simply knowing about the cognitive bias is un-
likely to prevent the occurrence Friedrich [1996], West et al. [2012]. Specific training
to de-bias participants has occasionally been shown as effective, but is still not widely
available Shaw et al. [2018].
4.5 Summary
Cyber red team members exhibited several biases and heuristics in our pilots. A
challenge is to categorize these aspects of behavior and work to control the environ-
ment of the attacker to disrupt them. Future experiments can then test whether
oppositional techniques will disrupt realistic attacker behavior.
One of the uniquely desirable traits of human factors is the focus on the human
performer in a system. By examining the cognition of attackers, situated in the
cyber ecosystem, one can apply cognitive theory to potentially disrupt their activity.
Human factors approaches are concerned with similar ideas, but subsumed by their
goals of improving rather than disrupting performance.
In fact, it is an open question whether an oppositional view will remain useful
in the eyes of the human factors community. Others have proposed that the field
should focus on providing joy and pleasure hedonomics Hancock et al. [2005]. We
suggest that OHF may disrupt the entire hedonomics hierarchy, from basic usability
to pleasurable design and affective experience. Attackers waive assurances to good
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(and certainly, pleasurable) system usability and design when they violate laws and
user agreements. Further, use of OHF may in fact be a form of safety in practice for
cybersecurity, as allowing attackers to operate within the perimeter of our networks
with full control of their cognition is a dangerous allowance. It should be noted that
designers are certainly aware, as are businesses, that humans have certain limitations
which can be exploited (for good, or not-so-good; Nodder, Chris [2013]).
We focused on oppositional methods here because, similar to cyber deception, they
have potential to be asymmetrically beneficial to defensive operations. Study of cyber
defense and the people who perform it reveal defense as a domain highly affectable by
human factors D’Amico and Whitley [2008], D’Amico et al. [2005], Gutzwiller et al.
[2015], Mahoney et al. [2010], Mancuso et al. [2015], and we suggest the incorporation
of OHF techniques may be a useful path forward. While studying the cyber attacker
is relatively uncommon in the human factors community, in comparison to improve-
ments for defender training, visualization tools, and communications, we argue that
it is likely to bear fruit.
A review of the literature reveals that studying cyber attackers from a cognitive
viewpoint appears to be missing experimentation and analysis. The attentional and
decision making examples provided above are from our pilot study, which provides
a deep perspective on the decision making process of the red teamers through talk-
aloud protocol and audio transcribing. The Tularosa Study begins to more rigorously
investigate how deception changes an attacker’s behavior and performance. While
data describing the decision process for the participants is more limited, it does
provide a breadth of over 130 red teamers’ experiences to analyze. Assessment of the
cognitive biases exhibited by the vast number of participants in this study is detailed
below.
Both the pilot studies and the Tularosa Study were designed to asses cyber decep-
tion which is just one technique in the OHF framework. Future experiments, which
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are out of the scope of this thesis, will be needed to further investigate the effec-
tiveness other techniques. Strategically forcing poor usability and inducing decision
making errors in malicious actors could reduce the impacts or success of a cyber at-
tack or even act as a deterrence. But first, one must answer: are decision making
and attentional biases observed in cyber attacker behaviors? In using our data to
search for the answer, we hope to gather information to craft situations which can be
used to create and test the disruption of attacker cognition and detail its outcomes
for network defense.
4.6 OHF Experimental Methodology
It was suspected that biases, being broadly applicable and pervasive across do-
main, will be evident in observations of attacker behavior in cybersecurity scenarios3.
To address our hypothesis H5,the focus was on five high-prominence cognitive biases
in decision making, selected from a survey list of over one hundred for their applica-
tion to cybersecurity, and for their likelihood of being induced by the experimental
conditions. While prior work described above using a different, but similar red team
experiment found evidence of bias and distraction Gutzwiller et al. [2019, 2018], the
methods were casual observation. They did not employ strict qualitative methods.
They also had no apparent a priori biases in mind to evaluate. Both are a necessary
and common component in qualitative data analysis, and they are provided here on a
larger, more complex dataset which used professional red teamers, realistic networks,
and manipulated deception techniques (Ferguson-Walter et al., 2019).
A rigorous scoring process, defined in the methods, was used in which carefully
defined biases were pulled into a rulebook for scoring. Multiple raters used the rule-
3This section is based on unpublished work: R. Gutzwiller, K. Ferguson-Walter, C. Johnson, L.
Guo and M. Major, “Evaluating Cybersecurity Red Team Cognitive Decision-Making Biases” , 2019
(in draft).
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book to score the briefing and chat data, which allowed for assessment of inter-rater
reliability. The main hypothesis here was that given biases pervasiveness in complex
environments, our anecdotal observations and subject-matter expert (SME) opinions,
and prior experiments Gutzwiller et al. [2019] that evidence of all decision-making
biases would be found in the given sample. An additional hypothesis was based on
the deception manipulation (i.e., the presence of fake cyber assets, such as servers) in
whether participants were told deception was present. Some biases may arise around
the manipulation; framing effects are created by giving the participants different in-
formation about the deception on the network and would be more likely in “informed”
conditions (or conditions following prior ‘informed’ sessions). Confirmation bias may
be more likely to bias behavior in the condition of informed as well, because par-
ticipants are prompted to consider whether various network items are real; testing
whether they are real or not is then ripe for confirmation-based testing given other
information.
4.6.1 Data Selection
To examine for cognitive biases, text-based outputs from participants were as-
sessed. The data would reveal enough to aid future development of more subtle
behavioral methods for assessment, as have been done elsewhere. For the current
study, the approach to qualitative data analysis involved the identification and cod-
ing of themes that appear in text passages from the daily briefing, and Mattermost
(chat) responses.
4.6.2 Biases Selection
An initial comprehensive list of cognitive biases in decision-making was developed,
using prior experience, prior literature reviews, and Wikipedia. Following the initial
terminology curation, we confirmed original citations and definitions of each bias or
effect.
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Next, biases were evaluated for their cyber security relevance to both red team
operations. Two further characteristics of the biases affected our final selections for
coding. The first was (1) likelihood of bias emergence given the participants’ tasks
performed in Tularosa. To consider this complex question, the combined team of
cognitive psychologists and cyber security SMEs reviewed all biases and determined
whether they were applicable to the contexts of the experiment, and whether the
exhibition of the bias would show up in text or chat reporting. Not all biases are
traceable in subjects reporting or communication. Second, we (2) considered whether
a bias was robust enough to show up in a noisy, realistic environment, and thus we
ignored a few of the narrower, laboratory-derived or small-effect size biases.
Next, we limit the number of biases scored to avoid overload of raters given the
amount of material and time, to seven. The biases chosen were (a) confirmation bias
Nickerson [1998], (b) framing effect Tversky and Kahneman [1981], (c) anchoring bias
Tversky and Kahneman [1974], (d) sunk cost fallacy Arkes and Blumer [1985], (e)
the availability heuristic Tversky and Kahneman [1974], the default effect Johnson
and Goldstein [2003], and illusory correlations Chapman [1967]. The list was then
turned into a rulebook by providing definitions and coding instructions.
4.6.3 Participants, Materials, & Data Inclusion Criteria
The Tularosa dataset consisted of 138 participants who each produced the fol-
lowing open-ended text files. There were three briefing reports and two days of
unstructured chat responses. Each were reviewed for all included participants and
scored for each of the five biases. For consistency with the data analysis described in
the previous chapter, we only discuss results of Day 1 here.
1. Mattermost Day 1, unstructured chat with real-time activity notation and
timestamps. Participants were given instructions on how to use the chat and
what content to send ahead of the experience. “When you learn potentially
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useful information about target systems on this network you will immediately
report this information to your team via your inter-net connected laptop using
the Mattermost website” and told to report “The last 2 octets of the IP address.
why you believe the host is interesting, how you obtained this information,
estimate its value to future operations”.
2. Briefing Day 1, short, open-ended questions within survey. “Please take 15
minutes to brief us on your experience during the cyber task on DAY ONE
(today). Please share any in-formation you think is relevant or important for
a briefing. Specific questions to consider include: major vulnerabilities found,
flaws in the network, success in exfiltrating assets, strategies you used, aspects
of the network that were particularly frustrating and/or confusing, and nature
of deception on network, if found.”
3. Overall Briefing, short, open-ended questions within survey. “Please take 15
minutes to brief us on your overall experience during the cyber tasks across
BOTH DAYS (today and yesterday). Please share any information you think
is relevant or important for a briefing. Specific questions to consider include:
information not included in either daily briefing, changes in strategy or approach
between the days, differences noted between the days, suspicions about the net-
works, etc.”
4.7 Data Labeling
The rules used for labeling data are detailed below. For each of the selected
bias we provide a generic definition developed before data coding began and then
a domain-specific example developed by a team of psychologists and cyber experts
during coding to ensure consistency. The results provided in Section 4.8 are based
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off a single expert’s coding of biases in the data. Future work will include using
additional experts for data coding.
Confirmation Bias (CB). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas related
to:
• The tendency to search for, interpret, focus on and remember information in a
way that confirms one’s preconceptions
• An unwitting/unconscious, less explicit, one-sided case-building process for
one’s beliefs
• Example: In a Present condition, an incorrect value judgment or exploit on a
decoy
• Example: In any condition, naively blaming failure on a non-existent source/feature
Framing Effect (FE). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas related
to:
• Changes in behavior or decision making associated with the way a problem or
situation is described (“framed”), even though the underlying environment is
still the same.
• Changes in evaluations of probabilities and outcomes when the same problem
is framed in different ways (e.g., positive or negative)
• Example: In an Informed condition, report asset as a fake/decoy when it is real
Anchoring Bias (AB). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas related
to:
• The tendency to rely too heavily, and essentially “anchor” oneself, to one trait
or piece of information when making decisions during the task.
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• The situation where people fail to adjust far enough from their initial estimate
to yield their final answer
• The tendency to be bias toward an initial estimate or belief, whether or not this
initial estimate is relevant to the current decision(s) at hand
• Example: Perseveration on belief/perception from Day 1 to Day 2 (across days),
e.g., Continue to look for deception throughout Day 2 while in AU
• Example: Perseveration on something after a change in the “world” has oc-
curred, e.g., Continue to believe networks are same between Day 1 and 2
Sunk Cost (SC). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas related to:
• Justification for increased investment of time or effort based on ongoing prior
investment ( in spite of) new evidence (available to the participant) suggesting
that the decision was probably wrong
• Continuing to work on a plan or action, despite knowing it is invalid or wrong
• Example: Perseveration on ONE machine when further actions are not useful
and they know it’s not a good idea
Default Effect (DE). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas related to:
• Evidence of a choice that was made among at least two options, one of which
could be viewed as a default option, in which the choice selected was the default.
• Evidence of a choice made among options where the option selected corre-
sponded to a default option that was deemed “easier” or requiring less effort
(physical or mental)
• Example: Using tools in default mode rather than parameters to better match
requirements, be more appropriate, etc. (this will be evident in other data
sources but not self-reports)
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Availability Heuristic (AH). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas
related to:
• The tendency to overestimate the likelihood of events which have greater ”avail-
ability” in memory (that are easier to call to mind). Usually related to how
recently the memory was formed, or how emotionally charged they may be.
• Example: No examples found in self-report data, due to what was reported
Illusory Correlations (IC). Rule for inclusion is any of the following ideas
related to:
• Evidence of perceiving a relationship (correlation) between two events, where
no such relationship exists (or where there is no evidence of such relationship)
• Example: Seeing relationship where no such relationship is possible/exists
• Example: Blaming failures on non-existent reasons when aware that this rela-
tionship is not true
We also coded for tunneling behavior, which was often seen in association with
the anchoring bias. An example of tunneling is: perseverating on one strategy across
multiple machines or returning to same machine repeatedly. We also counted the
number of incorrect identifications, namely, when a decoy was reported as real and
when a real machine is reported as fake (the latter is also an example of framing
effect in Informed conditions). For each of the cognitive biases as well as cognitive
tunneling, we used a binary labeling scheme, labeling the bias as present (or absent)
for each participant in each data source. However, for the incorrect IDs we wanted
a count so we labeled each occurrence of an IP address being misidentified (but only
once per IP). The analysis of this data was described in Chapter 3.
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CB FE A SC AH DE IC TB Total
Absent-Uninformed 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2
Absent-Informed 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Present-Uninformed 18 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 21
Present-Informed 26 6 3 0 0 0 0 6 41
Total 49 8 3 1 0 0 0 8 69
Table 4.1: Mattermost Day 1: Coding for evidence of cognitive biases in
real-time Mattermost chat logs for day 1. Note the large number of confirmation
biases seen in the Present conditions.
CB FE A SC AH DE IC TB Total
Absent-Uninformed (N=35) 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4
Absent-Informed (N=31) 3 6 0 0 0 0 0 3 12
Present-Uninformed (N=26) 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5
Present-Informed (N=29) 7 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 19
Total 19 17 0 0 0 0 0 4 40
Table 4.2: Red Team Briefing Day 1: Coding for evidence of cognitive biases
in end of day report for day 1. Note the large number of framing effect biases
seen in Informed conditions. Most participants completed this report so there is little
missing data (6 missing reports).
4.8 OHF Experimental Results
Given the rules and examples listed above, results are displayed in Tables 4.1,
4.2, and 4.3 displaying the number of cognitive biases evident in the different data
sources analyzed from the Tularosa Study.
Examples of confirmation bias go beyond misidentification and can be seen in this
example of participant in the Present-Informed condition naively blaming failure on
a non-existent feature, since this is one-side evidence that their failures are not their
fault. The tester did not identify the method of this obfuscation:
“There was evidence of deception occurring on the network. Systems
would be found to have a vulnerability, however, upon attempts to exploit,
the vulnerability would disappear, only to reappear later.”
One example of a framing effect observed in the Absent-Informed condition was
seen in the Red Teaming Briefing. Even though the participant did not feel they
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CB FE A SC AH DE IC TB Total
Absent-Uninformed (N=12) 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 3
Absent-Informed (N=13) 1 1 3 0 0 0 0 1 6
Present-Uninformed (N=9) 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Present-Informed (N=11) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 4 1 4 0 0 0 0 1 10
Table 4.3: Overall Briefing: Coding for evidence of cognitive biases in over-
all briefing report written at the end of day 1. Note the small number of biases
evident in this report could be caused by the increase in missing reports (77 missing
reports).
experience deception or were disrupted by it, because they were framed by being
informed that deception may be present they are blaming their failures on the non-
existent deception:
“ I would imagine that I missed the real deception on the network
which is why I did not get very far today.
One participant in the Absent-Informed condition explicitly mentioned their tun-
neling behavior in the Red Team Briefing:
“Overall, a very frustrating day – demonstrates that my skillset is
dated, and I am getting tunnelvision when trying to exploit a system.”
One example of Anchoring behavior leading to tunneling was identified in the
Overall Briefing where a participant in the Absent-Informed condition on Day 1 con-
tinue to see deception throughout Day 2 and focused on determining what was legit-
imate instead of stated goal:
“I began to question the legitimacy of all of the hosts that were shuf-
fled. Once I began to realize that this was the case, I decided to focus on
trying to identify legitimate hosts if any.”
4.8.1 Discussion of Observed Cognitive Biases
The Tularosa Study was not designed to measure cognitive biases in Red Teamer
behavior. It was designed to measure the effectiveness of deception against cyber
115
CB FE A SC AH DE IC TB Total
Absent-Uninformed 8 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 9
Absent-Informed 7 9 3 0 0 0 0 4 23
Present-Uninformed 24 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 27
Present-Informed 33 17 3 0 0 0 0 7 60
Total 72 26 7 1 0 0 0 13 119
Table 4.4: OHF Combined Results: Combination of counts of cognitive
biases in real-time Mattermost chat logs for day 1, Red Team Briefing
for day 1, and Overall Briefing. Note the smallest number is seen in the control
condition and the largest in the Present-Informed condition.
attacks. However, even though it was not the main purpose of the study, we see
evidence of over 100 cognitive biases in the data we examined (See Table 4.4). This
supports our hypothesis H5 that cognitive biases are prevalent in cyber attacker
behaviors and can be induced to disrupt attacks. There were likely many more biases
in play during the study that did not come across in the self-reports at all, or not
strongly enough to be coded as a bias. We do see a difference in the total number
of biases across the conditions (See Figure 4.1). This is largely explained by the
coding rules, since, for example, evidence of the framing effect would be much easier
to identify in the conditions where the Informed conditions where participants were
framed by being told deception may be present. As another example, we see that
many more examples of confirmation bias are identified in the present conditions.
This is because most participants begin the study with a belief that all the machines
on the network are real, and even when provided with the information that deception
may be present, still seem to look for evidence to confirm their preconceptions that
the machines are real and the information the scans provide on them are valid.
We see zero instances of Default Effect, Availability Heuristic, or Illusory Cor-
relations. This does not indicate that these biases weren’t present, rather that the
kinds of information reported by subjects did not supply the evidence required for
us to identify their presence. We can use Sunk Cost as an example to show why
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Figure 4.1: OHF Combined Results. Total counts of pre-selected cognitive biases
observed in self-report data.
it would be unusual to have enough data reported to identify many of these biases.
We only labeled one instance of Sunk Cost from a series of Mattermost data for one
participant in the Present-Uninformed condition. At 10:16, the participant targets a
specific machine and attempts to exploit it. They then report failure, stating that
the target “appear to have crashed”. They move on to fingerprint another machine.
At 10:25 they report that the original target has recovered and states: “Crash further
implies that target is vuln[sic] and the MS17-010 may have just failed as it does.
Attempting once more.” The next message says “Target has crashed again. No more
attempts will be made against [target].” They move on to other targets, but at 12:19
they return to the original target and attempt to exploit it again. The outcome is the
same: “[target] has crashed again... that sucks.” This was labeled as Sunk Cost, be-
cause the participant perseverates on that one target, even when aware further action
are not useful. Labeling this as Sunk Cost is clearly subjective, but the participant
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specifically states they will not be attacking the target again (we assume because they
do not think it will be useful to do so) and yet hours later they knowingly return to
that same machine.
We see that different style of reporting is more likely to make different biases clear.
For example, the Mattermost chat logs were intended for reporting information in real
time. This allows us to collect information that the participant thought worthy of
being reported in the moment, which might later by disproved, discarded or forgotten
before the end of day reports. The end of day reports tend to focus more on successes
and the overall briefings were designed to be information they would want passed on
to team members for further action.
When looking across the 138 participants, we see that 52 (38%) participants ex-
hibited at least one of the biases (or tunneling which can be viewed as an indicator
of anchoring) in at least one of the three data sources analyzed. Interestingly only
13% of those exhibiting a bias were in the control condition. In limited self-reports,
of which not all participants completed, we observed that over a third of the red
teamers exhibited at least one of the small subset of biases we selected. Furthermore,
87% of those participants were in a condition with cyber or psychological deception
employed, suggesting that the biases can be induced by deception and other methods.
This research clearly demonstrates that cognitive biases are effecting red teamer
behavior and that methods, such as cyber deception, that induce these biases in cyber
attackers, can change attacker behavior and improve defensive posture. Future work
will include creating custom experiments designed to specifically examine the effect
of cognitive biases in cyber and the ability for defenders to induce them to mitigate
attacks.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION ON HUMAN ASPECTS OF CYBER
SECURITY EVALUATIONS
Cyber security is becoming a universal requirement with millions of information
technology users invested in its effectiveness. As such, rigorous evaluation of cyber
security tools and techniques becomes a critical and growing part of the research
community. It is something that clients should require from cyber security vendors,
and it is something end users should be able to assume occurs in an non biased
manner. Part of this evaluation must include human-subjects experiments. Effort
is needed to understand what research from cognitive, behavioral, and social science
apply in cyber space and how to apply these findings to improve cyber security.
Studying red teamer behavior and cognition can inform defensive techniques to
increase attacker cost on the network and lead to understanding how to gain improve-
ments in adversary emulation performance and efficiency. These insights can improve
the security and defensibility of systems and networks. By better understanding the
human performance and human factors aspects of experts who are trained in adver-
sary emulation, we also better understand the adversary, and improve our defenses
against them. Our work is based on the assertion that the human component of the
cyber attack deserves more investigation.
Collecting the necessary data to understand attacker cognition and behavior from
existing cyber exercises, such as Capture-the-Flags (CTFs), presents many difficul-
ties. As designed, information about individual participant’s actions, perceptions, and
feelings are not isolated or collected. These are not intended to be rigorous controlled
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studies and are not required to complete Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval
for human subjects research (HSR). While CTFs have been proposed as great sources
of data for research Doupe´ et al. [2011], Sommestad and Hallberg [2012], they often
fundamentally serve a different purpose. Large-scale HSR studies on cyber attacker
behavior are required to study human behavior and cognition. This knowledge is
crucial to cybersecurity research focused on resilient, reliable, and adaptive defenses.
Red teamer behavior differs from unauthorized hacking, but research focused on bet-
ter understanding adversary emulation can fill a critical gap in knowledge.
5.1 Lessons Learned
In this section1, we will discuss design decisions which led to a test network and
methodology for the Tularosa Study which differs substantially from a standard CTF.
We will also outline lessons learned and trade-offs from multiple experimental stages
including design, execution, and data collection and highlight these findings with
insights drawn from participants’ self-reports. Our conclusions will address the inad-
equacies of CTFs for studying human’s behavior and provide guidance for designing
future experiments Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019b].
5.1.1 Participant Motivation.
The placement and collection of flags in CTFs does little to promote or account for
intrinsic motivation of cyber attackers. For research questions focused on cognition
and behavior, it is important to understand attacker motivation. This could vary
by sophistication of adversary, goals, resources, etc. To make an experiment more
realistic, it is important to try and replicate this motivation in the participant pop-
ulation. CTFs (and experiments) are time bounded which can increase the pressure
1This section is based on submitted work: K. J. Ferguson-Walter, M. M. Major, D. C. van
Bruggen, S. J. Fugate, R. S. Gutzwiller, The World (of CTF) is not Enough, IEEE Humans and
Cyber Security Workshop, 2019 (To appear).
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on a participant to find and exploit vulnerabilities to achieve the goal of collecting
more flags and “winning” the competition. It is important to consider whether or not
such methods of motivation align to real world scenarios and what the impact of that
difference in motivation may have on the experimental results. For example, does the
method of motivation impact which strategy an attacker chooses to use? How might
that effect the conclusions of the study? What methods could be used to mitigate
such an impact?
The overall design of the Tularosa Study was intended to capture the real-world
effects of deception on the performance of human attackers. Much of the experi-
mental design was intended to decrease the potential for confounding factors (e.g.,
isolating participants so that they do not interact on the problem set, which is very
different from a CTF environment). While more traditional CTF environments were
considered, several key issues discussed below drove our overall design decisions.
5.1.2 Experimental Validity
Based on the limitations of CTFs, some factors to carefully consider include con-
trolling for internal validity like ensuring each subject has the same tools and the
same target environment which ensures an equal chance to succeed. What we cannot
control are the participants themselves, and the methods they choose to use. These
uncontrolled variables make the process of evaluating human performance in a more
realistic scenario very challenging, and much harder than evaluating CTF success.
Examples of factors over which we have little control include: 1) Participants have
the same skill (i.e., “red teamer”), but their specialized experience and subset of skills
varied drastically (from 0.25 years to 20 years of experience in network penetration);
2) Methods of compromise were typical of red teamers — the use of the same tools
(e.g. nmap, hping3, Wireshark) — but the use of tools and techniques varied based
on subject’s background and level of familiarity; 3) Indicators of compromise and
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ease of detection within the data set varied based on the participants’ attacks. Even
the same attack, executed with a different tool, generated different data to provide
proof of the subject’s success. The effect of these differences across participants on
the analysis results should be minimized by random assignment of participants to
each condition.
While internal validity is important, external validity is also key. Yet, when
evaluating real-world cyber attacks, the limitation is in discovering all possible avenues
of compromise and methods used. However, if we can discover even some indicators
in this rigorous setting, this fills a gap in knowledge of how cyber attackers operate.
Furthermore, if we correlate these successful attacks to the cognition, experience,
characteristics, and strategies of the human behind the attack, this provides a wealth
of new information useful to cyber defenders, cybersecurity researchers, and tool
developers alike.
5.1.3 Human Subjects Research
Human subjects research requires IRB approval and voluntary consent of the
participants. This is different from how CTFs operate. CTF data collected does
not focus on human behavior or cognition, but rather on network activity and flag
capture. Use of CTF data is limited to a subset of research questions because it does
not include information on the humans—their expertise, experiences, thoughts, or
feelings.
5.1.3.1 HSR Data.
Studies in both computer and behavioral science have investigated different meth-
ods for soliciting details on human cognition, emotion, and decision making. Having
a trained expert observer being able to observe and question the participant might
provide the most detailed information about their thoughts and feelings, but the
trade-off is evident if there are any timing research questions being pursued, as these
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questions can take participants off task. On the other end of the spectrum, open
ended reporting, during and after the study can be less disruptive, but the freedom
it allows leads to a wide variance of useful information reported.
While our Pilot Studies had an observer for each participants, the Tularosa Study
relied on reports from the participants. Reporting in real time was needed to correlate
self-reported participant cognition and emotion with the time-stamped cyber and
physiological data. Additional reporting and questionnaires were provided at the end
of the task. The variance in real-time reporting ranged from zero to 304 chat messages
in a day with 17% providing zero for at least one day and under five percent skipping
at least one of the overall end-of-task red team reports.
Semi-structured questionnaires can lead the participants to provide details that
are specifically related to the research questions, but there are still other trade-offs to
consider. Answering a questionnaire at the end of the day, is notoriously less accurate
since human memory is faulty and biased, however stopping to answer questions in
the middle of the task can effect timing metrics. To waylay timing concerns, specific
breakpoints can be set to ask all participants to answer questions for the same time
period, however, this forces an unnatural break in their task and can cause extra
confusion and delay by taking them off task at inopportune times.
While the data collected from the Tularosa Study will no doubt be used to answer
various research questions across the community, the study was designed to answer
specific research questions on the effects of cyber and psychological deception on the
success of a red teamer when performing a network penetration task. To properly
proctor and monitor the execution of the study, sessions were limited to at most ten
participants. Precautions were taken to reduce the number of participants at one
time, group similar conditions together when possible, provide written and verbal
instruction, and reduce the chance of participants discussing or interacting with each
other during the study to reduce possible bias in the results. These reasons, in ad-
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dition to the desire to increase the number of participants per condition, influenced
the decision not to have participants work in teams. However, these decisions forced
proctors to run sessions over a broad period of time (14 months) which can effect
internal validity. Because the cyber world is fast paced, with new exploits and tech-
niques discovered to attack old vulnerabilities, even if the target network stays static,
the knowledge of the participants can change over time.
Studies need a much larger sample size when teams and competitions are involved.
This is an age-old problem in team research and one that is more challenging in
cybersecurity where the participant pool is restricted. The existing participants in
the Tularosa Study would have only created 46 teams when put into small three
person groups. Given four major conditions, this would have reduced comparisons
to 11 or 12 data points, a statistically non-viable tradeoff for initial research. Teams
would also make it harder to isolate and measure the data (i.e., number of successful
commands), and cognitive effects (i.e., feelings of confusion and frustration).
To elicit self-reporting of progress by each participant, and mimic the more re-
alistic team scenario, the task description also included instructions to report any
findings to an external “team” via a separate, internet-connected laptop with a Mat-
termost chat interface. While this instruction was designed as a motivator for detailed
red team reporting, some participants inferred that their task was only to perform
reconnaissance and that the external team would be responsible for exploit and exfil
tasks. The participants were also able to use this laptop to perform internet searches.
Participant browsing activities were collected throughout the study.
5.1.3.2 Red Team Population.
The Tularosa Study is novel among current human subjects studies to date due
to the inclusion of professional red-team participants. CTF challenges recruit partic-
ipants from all backgrounds and demographics, from curious hobbyists and profes-
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sional penetration testing experts, to hackers who specialize in unsanctioned cyber
activities. While these unauthorized hackers are the population from which we hope
to defend our networks, it is not feasible to assume they will volunteer for a controlled
research study. A hacker’s greatest asset is a treasure trove of skills and techniques
that are unknown or difficult to detect by most targets, and would not want to use
these tricks and tools in a fully-monitored environment.
Additionally, by collecting human subjects data, the Tularosa Study was able to
exclude data from participants who self-reported information that would have further
disqualified them from the initial recruitment (e.g., one subject with zero years of
experience; giving us 138 useable participants.)
Despite the professional backgrounds of the participants recruited for the Tu-
larosa Study, several exhibited their natural desire to break things and challenge the
resource-constrained environment. A subject on the very first day of the experiment
modified the attack laptop to connect to a wireless hotspot so they could download
additional tools. Because of this, future daily briefings were modified to specifically
ban WiFi.
5.1.4 Environment Design
5.1.4.1 Teams.
Conventional CTF environments tend to be team events which allow for fairly
free-form creative exploration of security deficiencies and techniques for maneuver,
exploitation, and exfiltration. In many cases individuals can use their own uniquely
developed capabilities and tools. This introduces a problem for experimentation. If
the research question relies on comparing an experiment treatment versus a control
condition (e.g., adding deception or other defenses to measure effects on performance),
then other factors (e.g., unique individual capabilities) have to be controlled. Other-
wise, the results may be due to those unique tools, and not the cognitive or behavioral
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effects of the experimental treatment. Additionally, as mentioned above, CTF partici-
pants often engage with each other for help; this introduces several sources of variance
that can disrupt the goals of an experiment. Therefore, in addition to restricting the
uniqueness of tools (participants could still request publicly available tools for their
environment), and by isolating each participant to their own test environment, we
intentionally limited the potential for interference from unique tools, external network
factors or human interactions.
5.1.4.2 Network.
In general then, the network and tasking needed to be as realistic as possible
without compromising internal validity. A simulated network was required to en-
sure that all participants were presented with the same network assets, topology, and
vulnerabilities. While a real network would have provided more external validity,
the internal validity would have suffered as there would be no way to ensure that
each participant started with a network of the same level of difficulty and compro-
miseablility. Furthermore, real users on a network, while providing extra realism, can
dramatically change the experiment in many unexpected ways (including providing
different footholds and attack vectors to one participant versus others).
5.1.4.3 Tasking.
The test network was configured to represent an isolated enterprise business net-
work consisting of dozens of servers and desktop computing systems running realistic
services and software applications. Participant tasking was designed to encompass
offensive activities of an unanticipated attacker, rather than a penetration test or red
team assessment. Participants were provided with a high-level description of their
task which included instructions to perform reconnaissance, system exploitation, and
data exfiltration. The only difference in task description between conditions was a
single sentence statement about the possible presence of deception on the network
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provided to the informed conditions. The psychological deception condition was
shaped by the information of the possible presence of deception being unaligned with
the true presence of decoy machines. All primary activities by the participants were
performed on a single laptop computer with a complete copy of Kali Linux which
was instrumented to perform various measurements of participant interaction. This
laptop was connected to the isolated test network with all external connections and
wireless connections disabled. The subject was not allowed to connect other devices
to the test laptop or to provide their own data, attack tools, or hardware. The isolated
nature of the test network is one aspect of the design that represents a significant
deviation from conventional CTF environments.
5.1.4.4 Metrics of Success.
A CTF challenge is heavily weighted toward scoring the simulated successes of the
participants. Flags are planted on target machines, and proof that the participant
successfully gained access to the flag is reported by the participant via the checksum
or hash of the flag. This is a single point of success that can be easily and accurately
measured. However, CTF challenges do not usually score a myriad of other success
metrics that should matter to an attacker, such as the ability to remain undetected,
to gain persistence, to pivot through a network, and to gain meaningful information
to infiltrate other related devices at a later date. CTFs often carefully design and
place flags to mimic the vulnerabilities in a real network by nesting flags in various
locations and designing different difficulty levels for collection of the flags. However,
because of the other aspects of attacker behavior that are omitted from this score,
we feel that this significantly changes the goal and motivation of the attacker. This
leads to a significant change in attacker cognition and behaviors, which influenced the
decision to not include flags in the Tularosa Study. Researchers may be interested
in a wide range of measures of success including: level of compromise and methods
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used to gain compromise, efficient use of tools, complexity of exploits, efficiency of
exploits, noisiness, persistence gained, backdoors established, etc.
Flags are commonly used in CTFs as a proxy for score or success, and if a study
does not use flags, a different method for determining success must be devised. Count-
ing the number of flags each participant collects is a quick way to measure which
participants made the most progress. There are different strategies and methods for
developing flags, with some tied to key terrain and the network, and others just amus-
ing puzzles. However, especially for a study focused on deception, flags become more
complicated. Should flags be associated with only real things on the network? If so,
this is an easy “tell” for determining real from decoy. Should we include false flags?
This could mislead a participant in an unfair way, biasing the results too heavily in
favor of deception.
Even in studies where deception doesn’t play a role, hunting for flags biases the
behavior of the participant, which may or may not mimic their actual strategy in
a more realistic attack scenario. Do they collect all the easy, low-point flags first?
This may just be their strategy to win the game, and not how they would normally
perform. In the Tularosa Study, many participants self-reported a desire to remain
undetected, despite the single-day time constraint. Many CTF competitions also give
direct feedback to participants on if the flag is valid and its point value. This cycle of
feedback helps keep CTF challengers interested and engaged in the competition, but
does not represent a realistic cycle of feedback in a real network penetration scenario,
particularly where false documents and decoy systems are a realistic threat to the
perceived successes of an attacker.
Furthermore, CTFs often have leaderboards that inform participants how well
they are performing compared to other teams. Leaderboards and the direct compet-
itive aspects with teams competing against each other could unnecessarily change a
participant‘s behavior, which provides further evidence of how using CTF to capture
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human behavior might provide an inaccurate picture of cognitive choices and human
performance.
5.1.4.5 Data Collection.
CTF competitions collect some cyber data that can provide insight into the red-
teamers’ actions to recon and infiltrate the target network, however most CTFs collect
basic content, such as packet captures and exfiltrated flags, only the latter of which
are actively used to evaluate participant success within the competition. Conversely,
the Tularosa Study collected additional types of data, including cognitive surveys,
physiological data, raw process and log data, and subject self-reported cyber strate-
gies.
The Tularosa Study permitted participants to each attack an identical copy of
the same network, without interference from any other subject. As a consequence,
139 different networks were launched throughout the scenario, each utilizing one of
three possible configurations (held constant across conditions). Individual host data
were not collected from these environments, but the amount of data created by each
subject having their own private target was still significant, as there was no log data
or network activity overlap between participants.
In addition to process log data, each event-based data point in the Tularosa dataset
includes a referential timestamp, through which a timeline of events for an entire
subject’s activities could theoretically be constructed. Timeline assessments can help
answer research questions that examine correlations between the presence of decoys
and time spent on various actions such as recon, and provides further insight linking
cognitive state to cyber success.
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5.1.4.6 Timestamp Correlation.
The collection of timestamps for each data point related to cyber activity is crit-
ical. However, not all of the subject’s activities could be synchronized to the same
time server and no optimal solution was readily available.
Timestamped resources include: 1) The subject’s Kali laptop, on the target net-
work with a local NTP Server (explicitly off-limits for participants to attack), 2) the
internet-connected reference and reporting machine, which pulled its date/time from
NIST internet time servers, 3) the Empatica E4 physiological monitoring wristband
devices, which were reasonably synchronized when connected to a proctor setup lap-
top, not connected to the subject’s environment, and 4) the proctor’s cell phone,
which was used to log the minute that the participants started the cyber task and
took breaks and lunches. The connecting piece of the timestamp puzzle was 5) an
iPhone, which used the “Timestamp Camera Basic” app to timestamp a video which
visually recorded the clock on the Kali screen, the clock on the internet-connected
machine, and the timestamps logged from a script running on that machine that was
then used to synchronize with the physiological devices.
5.1.4.7 Data Coding.
Large and heterogenous data collections can be difficult to analyze. After exper-
imental design and execution the immense challenge of labeling and analyzing the
data begins. The first step is reducing each data source to the key features through
which the data can be surveyed to answer research questions.
Raw Data, existing in the same format it was created, is often unusable. Pro-
cessed/Extracted Data takes the raw data files and converts it to smaller, standardized
formats. Queried Data imports the formatted data into tools such R and MySQL, and
searches for patterns, statistics, and outliers. New contextual metadata are added to
the dataset. Subject matter experts generate Labeled Data by applying professional
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evaluations of the subject’s cognitive state and activities. For example, cognitive
psychologists review the participants’ self-reported log data and label content which
contains indicators of confusion, frustration, biases, and confidence in success. Fi-
nally, Expert Analysis leverages technical expertise to extract difficult ground-truth
data to evaluate the accuracy of a subject’s self-reported cyber efforts, in addition to
cyber activities that the subject did not report.
5.1.5 Realism versus Repeatability
An enduring problem for security research is obtaining ground truth informa-
tion. Methods for obtaining ground truth data or proxies for ground truth data vary
greatly, and can be a difficult task. When designing an approach, it is important to
consider the validity of information collected, both external validity (i.e., how well
does the study generalize to different circumstances) and internal validity (i.e., how
well designed is the study to support making causal inferences). Further, external
validity can consider questions regarding ecological validity (i.e.,how well does the
experiment map to real world situations?), population validity (i.e., how well do the
participants align with the larger population?), and historical validity (i.e., how well
do these results hold up over time?). When designing a study, multiple situations call
for making a trade-off between different types of validity.
While a real operational network would have provided the most realistic environ-
ment, as discussed previously, the study was more interested in controlling across
conditions and participants to ensure internal validity. Realism, while desirable, was
not the top concern. Based on the initial2 Pilot Study Ferguson-Walter et al. [2017]
performed, it is believed that both cyber and psychological deception may be more ef-
fective on an operational network, where the natural messiness of a large network with
2Additional pilots were implemented to test changes in the design, procedure, environment, and
data collection. Pilot studies are highly recommended.
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real users improves the plausibility of the deceptive effects, and provides additional
confusion through real complexities and anomalies.
5.1.6 Managing Red Teamers
The Tularosa experiment sampled red teamers from diverse skill sets and back-
grounds, and managed several individuals with the desire to challenge the purpose
of the experiment rather than to overcome challenges inherent to the network. One
subject stated early on Day 2, “I have shifted my perspective to more creative attacks
not likely considered by those that set up the lab”. The mildly disobedient behavior
of the participants could not be easily controlled. Not all participants felt that the
challenge was worthy of their skills. Some participants neglected to pay attention
during the proctor briefing, and other participants egregiously defied lunch, break
times, and end times. These are challenges inherent to managing human subjects,
and definitely should not be unexpected in experiments involving cyber adversarial
behavior.
Using professional penetration testers to perform adversary emulation and provide
subject matter expertise will more closely match activity performed by unauthorized
hackers than many other populations. While many participants in CTFs are also
experts, little data (e.g., demographics and expertise questionnaires) are collected to
determine if any of the data should be excluded from analysis. This allows for easier
recruiting, with the score earned by flag collection used as a proxy for expertise.
While Red Teamers are often accustomed to working in teams, individual partici-
pants increase the power of the results and allow for easier isolation and measurement
of behaviors. However, the lack of teams increased frustration and effectiveness of
some participants and some research questions involving team dynamics cannot be ad-
dressed without them. Future work is needed to address research questions regarding
teams.
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5.1.7 Cognitive Considerations
While there are many design decisions necessary for any study, we will detail three
main cognitive considerations critical to future study design. First, measurement of
human behavior and cognition requires IRB approval while measurement of network
and computer activity does not. Extra precautions must be taken to conduct HSR
studies and protect participants, but they provide necessary insight and understand-
ing about the motivations, perceptions, emotions, and decisions of the people being
studied. CTF and other events focused on the network activity and successful col-
lection of flags have less difficulty recruiting expert participants and do not need to
instrument host machines for data collection, thus relieving privacy concerns of the
participants.
Second, when participant goals are not specific, intrinsic motivation guides the
red teamer behavior making it possible to see more varied tactics, techniques and
procedures. Allowing participants to decide what they deem reportable reveals what
they perceive as important. Collection of flags, while increasing speed and ease of
judging success, may provide faulty extrinsic motivation and skew the resulting human
behavior which we desire to study.
Lastly, verbal explanation of thoughts and decisions in real time provides detailed
information vital to understanding cyber attackers. However, while the quantity
and quality of useful information in questionnaires greatly varies, they can provide
some insight into the thought process of the participant without requiring complete
isolation (e.g., only running one participant at a time).
5.2 Concluding Remarks
Our work is unique among the cyber defense community and is one example of
research that fills a critical gap in computer security research. Achieving more formal
scientific underpinnings of computer security requires the use of the scientific method.
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More rigorous experimentation to better understand cyber attackers and defenders
is needed. CTFs do not provide us with the robust experimental design required to
provide definitive answers to our most pressing cyber challenges. That said, CTF
events were never intended to answer scientific questions. This does not mean they
could not provide scientific insights. To do so, CTF events should focus more on
measuring human effects in addition to system impacts and those measures which
have more direct value to a competitive environment.
Traditional experimental paradigms such as those used in the Tularosa Study
make significant trade-offs to achieve control over experimental conditions, some-
times eschewing ecological validity for the purposes of answering current hypotheses.
Research on cyber defenders is a growing area on interest, but research on cyber
attackers has been a slower effort. Understanding attacker cognition and behavior
in cyberspace can be a critical, but often overlooked component of improving cyber-
security. These research finding can help more accurately model attacker behavior
for testing of systems and techniques and possibly aid in increasing the realism of
attacker emulation and improve red teamer training. They can also help understand
how to create new techniques that focus on decisions made by a human attacker,
rather than just blocking their movement on the network.
As cyber security becomes increasingly a mainstream concern, we see a rise in
discussions on the adoption of automated and autonomous systems. Incorporation
of deception into adaptive defensive systems are inevitable. Experiments like the
Tularosa Study are necessary, not only, to know how to design these systems to best
adapt their deceptive defenses to changing attacker behavior, but to measure the
effectiveness of the systems themselves.
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5.3 Summary of Findings
Our research provides new contributions in the area of cyber deception — a grow-
ing and promising area of research in the computer security community. Our work
contributes to the understanding, measurement, and implementation of cyber decep-
tion to improve cyber defense. We detailed our pilot studies and Tularosa experi-
mental design and execution, including trade-offs and lessons learned. We performed
data analysis to examine the effectiveness of cyber deception, with consideration of if
the attacker is aware of the deception, and discussed results indicating that a combi-
nation of the presence of deception and the information that deception is being used
for defense can impede attacker forward progress, increase detectability, and boost
attacker confusion and surprise. We also provided examples of evidence of cognitive
biases exhibited by the red teamers during cyber attacks in the pilot studies and
Tularosa data, providing corroboration to our theory of oppositional human factors
for cyber defense.
Human-decision making is a critical but often overlooked component of cyber
security. While the elusive hacker community will likely remain difficult to study,
we believe there is vital research that can be done on a similar population—the
authorized hacker, also known as a white hat hacker, red team, or purple team.
Initial characterization of the red team population in the Tularosa Study determined
that they tend to have a more rational, less avoidant, and less spontaneous decision-
making style that the general population. They have a faster reaction time and
higher need for cognition and tend to pursue difficult problems and enjoy the process
of thinking. They tend to be more decisive, have a higher predilection towards trust
and compliance, a higher level of efficiency and organization, and are less neurotic.
It seems that some of these traits are specific to the white hat variety, since many
hacker communities are well known for their lack of trust and compliance.
135
While much future work remains to learn how to improve the use of cyber decep-
tion for cyber defense, this research makes some initial contributions addressing the
following hypotheses:
• Hypothesis H1: Defensive cyber, and psychological, deception tools impede at-
tackers who seek to penetrate computer systems and infiltrate information. To
address this hypothesis we compared performance on the cyber task between
control and experimental conditions. We found that participants in the Present
conditions had statistically significantly less keystrokes as well as fewer com-
mands containing real IP addresses, indicating fewer real machines targeted.
Participants in the Present conditions correctly identified the Domain Con-
troller as a high value target less often than those in the Absent condition;
we also noted a trend of fewer reported exploit successes in the Present con-
dition. The participants in the Present conditions also triggered statistically
more snort alerts than those in the Absent condition, increasing the risk of ex-
posing themselves to defenders. These results are all consistent with a delay in
forward progress and support the hypothesis that cyber deception tools impede
attackers.
• Hypothesis H2: Defensive deception tools are effective even if an attacker is
aware of their use. To address this hypothesis we compared performance on
the cyber task between conditions where participants were informed about
deception to where they were not informed. We found that participants in
the Present-Informed condition reported significantly more confusion and were
most easily detected (based on Snort alert count). The participants in the
Present-Informed condition had significantly more decoy alerts overall and trig-
gered the first decoy alert faster than those in the Present-Uninformed condi-
tion, indicating more aggressive initial behavior. However, participants in the
Present-Informed condition had statistically fewer probe alerts and intrusion
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alerts which would be triggered later in the kill chain, indicating less forward
progress. In general, we found that the Present-Informed condition had the
most effected behavior across many measurements consistent with the idea that
a combination of information about and presence of deception will provide the
best defense. This is counter to common thinking that deception tactics must
remain covert to be effective. Participants in the Present-Informed condition
also reported less failures, likely due to attribution of the failures more on the
deception than on themselves.
• Hypothesis H3: Defensive deception is effective even if the attacker merely
believes that a tool may be in use, even when it is not. To address this hypothesis
we will compared performance on the cyber task between control condition
and psychological deception condition. There were no statistically significant
findings in this data to support this hypothesis. There was supporting evidence
in the self-reports of the Absent-Information condition i.e., blaming failures on
non-existent deception. We assert that additional experiments with more real-
world network, user, and system details, to better match the natural messiness
cyber space are needed to address this hypothesis.
• Hypothesis H4: Defensive cyber, and psychological, deception causes increased
frustration, confusion, and self-doubt in the attacker, which impacts perfor-
mance in cyber penetration tasks. To address this hypothesis we compared
the levels of cognitive effects reported between control group and experimental
conditions and then compare level of cognitive effects across all conditions. The
participants in the Informed conditions reported significantly more surprise than
those in the Uninformed conditions. Similar to our H2 findings, this further
supports our theory that informing attackers of deceptive techniques when they
are in use can benefit defenders. We also noted that frustration significantly
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increased on the second day for participant moving from an Absent condition
to a Present condition. The participants in the Present-Informed condition also
reported a significantly higher suspicion of deception. These results, considered
with the support for H1 described above, are consistent with the idea that
exacerbating feelings of confusion and surprise impact cyber performance.
• Hypothesis H5: Cognitive biases are prevalent in cyber attacker behaviors and
can be intensified to disrupt cyber attacks. To address this hypothesis we cata-
loged the types of cognitive biases observed in the cyber deception experiments,
providing corroboration to our theory of oppositional human factors aiding cy-
ber defense. Similar to our H2 findings, evidence of confirmation bias and
framing effects is most prevalent in the Present-Informed condition.
Additionally, our empirical assessment of cyber deception demonstrated the tech-
nical utility of decoy systems in the following ways:
• For conditions where decoys were present, every participant triggered a decoy
alert prior to any successful exploitation of real machines.
• For conditions where decoys were present, 35% of the packets sent targeted
decoy IPs.
• For conditions where decoys were present, more IDS alerts are on decoys than
real machines.
• For conditions where decoys were present, the number of Snort alerts on real
machines were reduced by about half, when compared to the Absent conditions.
• The participants in the Present conditions were not easily able to identify the
decoys and misidentified a total of 254 assets.
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In summary, our research design and data analysis provides empirical evidence
that not only is cyber deception an effective technique for impeding cyber attacks,
but it may actually be more effective if the attacker is aware of the presence of
deception.
5.4 Future Work
The initial Tularosa data analysis results are consistent with the theory that suspi-
cion by an attacker that deceptive defenses are in place can increase its effect on cyber
attack behavior and improve defensive posture. However, future work is still needed.
Security best-practices and security hygiene behavior will always be a critical, but
not sufficient, component of cyber security. The amount of detailed information pro-
vided, the method and the timing with which that information about the deceptive
defenses is given is bound to be important, and requires further examination; we are
planning future experiments to examine these questions. What is the best amount
of information to provide? It is likely that providing too many details such as which
commercial decoy system is deployed, on which subnets, and what configuration each
decoy is using will make the systems ineffective. Even without providing this de-
tailed information, it is likely that some Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) will
still be able to devise a method for differentiating and avoiding decoys on networks
of interests. Cyber security is an arms race, and cyber deception does not change
that. However, there is extra attacker time and resources that these techniques force
to be spent, and even if one APT finds a work around, these defenses can still help
protect the network from other attackers. However, network defenders and owners
must always remain vigilant.
Future work will take us in many directions. Further analysis of the Tularosa
data will examine Day 2 data to assess the persistence of effects of cyber and psycho-
logical deception over time, as well as the physiological and cognitive data matched
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with more complex measures of success indicated by the cyber data. We intend to
design and execute new experiments focused on measuring and intensifying cognitive
biases—carefully selecting biases relevant to cyber operations. As we continue to fo-
cus on artificial intelligence for adaptive decoy systems, we intend to use these and
future data analysis results to inform our utility scores, reward functions, and mod-
els Bilinski et al. [2019], Ferguson-Walter et al. [2019a], Fugate and Ferguson-Walter
[2019]. We will continue to work with experts in cyber operations to improve our un-
derstanding of attacker and defender decision-making and work to improve reasoning
and decision-making models to better account for realistic human-behavior. Finally,
we are planning to work with several large CTF-style events to determine how to
better to leverage these events to better collect useful data to help fuel the research
community.
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APPENDIX A
INDIVIDUAL MEASURES
A.1 Red Team Briefing
Following the network penetration task each day, participants were asked to spend
15 minutes responding to an open-ended question about their experience. The fol-
lowing language was used to prompt participants, with the day updated to “ONE”
or “TWO” and the underlined portion only displayed to participants who were in an
informed condition that day:
Please take 15 minutes to brief us on your experience during the cyber task on DAY
ONE (today). Please share any information you think is relevant or important for
a briefing. Specific questions to consider include: major vulnerabilities found, flaws
in the network, success in exfiltrating assets, strategies you used, aspects of the net-
work that were particularly frustrating and/or confusing, and nature of deception on
network, if found.
A.2 Overall Briefing
Following the Day 2 Red Team Briefing, participants were to respond the follow-
ing open-ended question about their experience:
Please take 15 minutes to brief us on your overall experience during the cyber tasks
across BOTH DAYS (today and yesterday). Please share any information you think
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is relevant or important for a briefing. Specific questions to consider include: infor-
mation not included in either daily briefing, changes in strategy or approach between
the days, differences noted between the days, suspicions about the networks, etc.
They were then asked to answer the following questions:
How much do you rely on each source of information/reference material during a
typical engagement on a scale from 1 to 5? (With “1” indicating not at all and “5”
indicating frequently).
• Public Internet (website/forums)
• Corporate forums (e.g., internal wiki)
• Professional network (friends/colleagues)
• Private forums (e.g., restricted IRC channel)
• Personal resources (e.g., code repositories, notes)
• Books/printed materials
How would you rate the tools available to you a scale from 1 to 5? (With “1” indi-
cating none of the tools you needed were available and “5” indicating you had every
tool you needed).
Were there any tools you would normally rely on that we didn?t give you? If so,
which ones?
Before coming to participate in this exercise, did you do any research on the project
beyond the information provided in the recruitment message? If so, please describe.
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Did you discuss the cyber task with other red teamers (e.g., at lunch or between
Day 1 and Day 2)? If so, what did you talk about?
A.3 Cyber Task Questionnaire
On each day, participants were asked about the psychological and cognitive effects
of their experience during the network penetration task. The following language was
used to prompt participants, with the day updated to “ONE” or “TWO” and the
underlined portion only displayed to participants on Day 2:
While working on the cyber task on DAY ONE:
1. On a scale from 1-5, how much confusion did you experience throughout the
task? (With “1” indicating you were never confused and “5” indicating you
were always confused). What caused your confusion?
2. On a scale from 1-5, how much self-doubt did you experience throughout the
task? (With “1” indicating you never doubted yourself and “5” indicating you
were always doubting yourself). What caused your self-doubt?
3. On a scale from 1-5, how confident did you feel throughout your attack? (With
“1” indicating not confident at all and “5” indicating very confident).
4. On a scale from 1-5, how surprised were you during the task by unexpected
aspects of the network? (With “1” indicating not at all surprised and “5”
indicating very surprised). What surprised you?
5. On a scale from 1-5, how frustrated were you during the task by unexpected
aspects of the network? (With “1” indicating not at all frustrated and “5”
indicating very frustrated). What frustrated you?
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6. Please describe your planned, attempted, successfully executed, and/or unsuc-
cessfully executed strategies.
7. Do you believe deception was present on the network on either Day 1 or Day
2? If so, what do you believe the deception entailed? On which day or days was
it present?
A.4 Demographics Questionnaire
Participants were asked to answer the following questions:
What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
• Other
What is your age range?
• Less than 35 years
• 35-50 years
• Over 50 years
What is the highest level of education you’ve completed?
• High School
• Associates/Technical School
• Bachelors
• Masters
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• PhD
Is English your primary language?
• English is primary language
• English is secondary language
A.5 Experience Questionnaire
Participants were asked the following questions about their red teaming experi-
ence:
For each of the following areas, please rate your level of expertise on a scale of 1
to 5 (1 = novice, 5 = expert):
• Cyber security
• Network penetration
• Host penetration
• Network reconnaissance
• Incidence response
• Generalized defense practice
• Network protocol reverse engineering
• Binary reverse engineering
How involved are you in each phase of an engagement, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 =
least, 5 = most)? (Phases from Lockheed Martin “Cyber Kill Chain”).
• Reconnaissance (e.g., harvesting email addresses)
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• Weaponization (coupling exploit with backdoor into deliverable payload)
• Delivery of weaponized bundle via email, web, USB, etc.
• Exploitation (execute code on victim?s system)
• Installation of malware on the asset
• Command and control channel for remote manipulation of the victim
• Actions on objectives/accomplishment of goals
How well do each of these objectives describe a typical engagement you are in-
volved with, on a scale of 1 to 5 (1 = least, 5 = most)?
• Compliance testing (e.g., HPPA)
• Blue team training
• Demonstrate needs for increased security investments
• Whiteboarding / gaming / tabletop exercises
• Post-attack remediation effort
• Vulnerability analysis (e.g., source code / reverse engineering)
• Security architecture review
• Persistent adversary (APT) emulation
Please indicate how many years of experience you have in each of the following
areas:
• Cyber security
• Network penetration
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• Host penetration
• Network reconnaissance
• Incidence response
• Generalized defense practice
• Network protocol reverse engineering
• Binary reverse engineering
Which operating system do you use the most (Linux, Windows, or Other)? If ”Other”
please specify.
What is the context in which you generally work? Please answer each of the fol-
lowing:
• Size of the team you normally work in (Individually, 2-3 people, or 4 or more
people)
• What is the total duration of a typical engagement (1-2 days, 3 days-1 week,
1-2 weeks, 2 weeks to one month, or over one month)?
• Types of expertise on the team (place an X next to each category, as applies to
the core team):
– Network penetration
– Host penetration
– Network reconnaissance
– Incidence response
– Generalized defense practice
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– Network protocol reverse engineering
– Binary reverse engineering
– Other (Please Specify)
• Expertise of other people you have easy access to, if needed (place an X next
to each that applies):
– Network penetration
– Host penetration
– Network reconnaissance
– Incidence response
– Generalized defense practice
– Network protocol reverse engineering
– Binary reverse engineering
– Other (Please Specify)
A.6 Deception Questionnaire
Participants were asked the following open-ended questions:
• What makes you suspicious?
• When you experience something as suspicious, what do you interpret it as?
• When attacking a system, would you be likely to you think that the system has
deception mechanisms in place?
• When attacking a system, do you first look for signs for deception?
• How do you respond when you suspect deception is in the system?
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• How do you respond when you confirm the system is utilizing deception?
• If you attacked a system where deception was used, how likely are you to think
deception will be present the next time you attack it?
• If you attacked a system where deception was used, how likely is it that you
will attack the system again?
• If you attacked a system where deception was used, do you think that a Blue
Team is also operating as part of the defense?
• If the system explicitly warned you that deception is present, how likely are you
to believe the message?
• If we wanted to convince attackers that deception is present, what should we
do?
• If we wanted to convince attackers that no deception is present, what should
we do?
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APPENDIX B
TASK BRIEFING
See below for the exact wording used in the task briefing at the start of the day.
The underlined sections were only shown to participants in the informed condition.
Scenario
You represent an APT group attempting to gather information from the company
Demokratika Petroleum (abbreviated as DP). You have achieved an initial foothold
on the DP company network, and now must discover as much as you can about
potentially valuable targets on the network. You will conduct recon on the network
and locate vulnerable services, misconfigurations, and working exploits. Specifically,
your task is to provide actionable intelligence about the company network which can
be used by the follow-on team over the next 3-6 months. Your objective is to collect
as much relevant information about the target network as you can in the allotted
time without compromising future network operations.
There may be deception on the network.
Procedures
1. You will access the DP network using a dedicated laptop which has a Kali Linux
operating system to use for reconnaissance and system exploitation (user: root
password: toor). There is a Kali repository installed on the computer and you
may install additional tools as needed during your activities.
2. You will also have access to a second laptop which is connected to the internet
for research and technical assistance (user: recoilforce password: f0r3ns1c).
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However, you may not electronically transfer information from this internet
connected laptop to the attack laptop (or vice versa); you must manually enter
all commands, reporting, etc.
3. When you learn potentially useful information about target systems on this net-
work you will immediately report this information to your team via your internet
connected laptop using the Mattermost website at mattermost-dev.recoilforce.net
using the following format:
• The last 2 octets of the IP address
• Why you believe the host is interesting
• How you obtained this information
• Estimate its value to future operations
You don’t need to be sure about a host to file a report; you can make multiple
reports on the same host. Normally you will not receive a reply to these reports,
but they are your primary deliverable.
4. Additional notes, commands, etc (that are not sent in a Mattermost report)
should be kept in the file /root/notes
5. We will be monitoring your progress, and taking into account how noisy your
activities are. Prioritize obtaining as much actionable intelligence about tar-
get systems as possible without compromising future operations on the target
network.
6. If you experience any technical difficulties, you can reach technical support using
Mattermost at
mattermost-dev.recoilforce.net, which is the homepage in Firefox.
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7. A proctor will be present for general questions, including help contacting techni-
cal support. The proctors and tech support are not role-players in the simulation
and may not be consulted for help in performing tasks on the network; they are
here to facilitate your independent effort.
8. If you need to reboot either laptop for any reason, ask a proctor for assistance
so that we can ensure it is collecting the data for this exercise. (For example,
the attack laptop is running screen capture and keyboard capture programs).
Ground Rules:
• Limit your recon/attacks to the simulation network, 192.168.5.0/24. Within this
network, do not perform attacks against the NTP server, located at 192.168.5.2
(it provides accurate time for data collection purposes and is not relevant to
the task). The DP infrastructure is virtualized. You may not attack the virtual
infrastructure (the hypervisor). You may not perform physical attacks on the
system or social engineering attacks.
• Do not stop the recording programs running on our laptops (e.g. screen and
keyboard capture). The information collected is important to the exercise we
have hired you to support and will not be linked to your identity. Please help us
protect your privacy by NOT entering any personally-identifying information
(such as using your name in your notes or Mattermost reports, or logging into
Facebook) on either laptop.
• You may not make copies of information (including software) from any of our
computer systems to any storage device or computer system except the ones
we have provided. Do not enable the WiFi on the attack client computer or
connect it to any network other than the simulation network provided.
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• Do not disclose your observations about the network simulation, its vulnerabil-
ities, or defenses encountered. This includes not discussing your observations
with other participants present at this event or with individuals that might be
participating in future sessions; each individual’s performance must be indepen-
dent. This is important to the scientific validity of our results.
• You are expected to utilize your cyber-security subject matter expertise and
perform to the best of your ability, however you are not required to utilize
knowledge or techniques deemed proprietary by your employer.
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APPENDIX C
SCHEDULE
Day 1
8:30 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. (Introduction and Set-Up): Participants were introduced to
the study and assigned a work station. Participants who opted in to the HSR portion
also had the Empatica E4 set up and filled out the Experience Questionnaire. All
participants worked through an electronic task briefing to orient themselves with the
red teaming scenario (see Appendix B). Those in the informed condition were also
verbally informed that deception may be present on the network.
9:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. (Cyber Task, Part 1): Participants started on the network
penetration task. Proctors noted the timing of breaks and any extreme behaviors
(e.g., slamming mouse down in frustration) in the HSR subjects.
11:30 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. (Lunch Break): Participants were given a lunch break
and reminded not to discuss the details of the cyber task, as per the nondisclosure
agreement.
12:00 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. (Cyber Task, Part 2): Participants continued the network
penetration task. Proctors continued to note the timing of breaks and any extreme
behaviors in HSR subjects.
4:00 P.M. to 4:15 P.M. (Briefing): All activity on the attack laptops was halted
and participants filled out the Day 1 Red Team Briefing (see Appendix A)
4:15 P.M. to 5:15 P.M. (Task Battery or Report Writing): Participants who opted out
of the HSR portion continued to write a report on the cyber task (continuing the red
team briefing). Participants who opted into the HSR portion complete the following
tasks in order: Shipley-2 (hard copy), Day 1 Cyber Task Questionnaire (hard copy),
Demographics Questionnaire (computer), Big Five Inventory (computer), General
Decision-Making Style Inventory (computer), Indecisiveness Scale (computer), San-
dia Matrices (computer), Over-Claiming Questionnaire (computer), and Sleep Quality
Questionnaire (computer).
5:15 P.M. to 5:30 P.M. (Wrap-Up): Participants were reminded what to expect
the next day and not to discuss the task with others. Proctors collected the Empat-
ica E4 devices from participants who participated in the HSR portion of the study.
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Day 2
8:30 A.M. to 9:00 A.M. (Introduction and Set-Up): Participants were reminded of
the rules of engagement and told they would be working on a separate network on
Day 2 (compared to Day 1). Participants who opted into the HSR portion of the
study also had the Empatica E4 devices set up. All participants were given a hard
copy of the task briefing document (see Appendix B); those in the informed condition
were verbally told that deception may be present on the network.
9:00 A.M. to 11:30 A.M. (Cyber Task, Part 1): Participants started on the network
penetration task. Proctors noted the timing of breaks and any extreme behaviors
(e.g., slamming mouse down in frustration) in the HSR subjects.
11:30 A.M. to 12:00 P.M. (Lunch Break): Participants were given a lunch break
and reminded not to discuss the details of the cyber task, as per the nondisclosure
agreement.
12:00 P.M. to 4:00 P.M. (Cyber Task, Part 2): Participants continued the network
penetration task. Proctors continued to note the timing of breaks and any extreme
behaviors in HSR subjects.
4:00 P.M. to 4:30 P.M. (Briefing): All activity on the attack laptops was halted
and participants filled out the Day 2 Red Team Briefing followed by the Overall
Briefing (see Appendix A).
4:30 P.M. to 5:15 P.M. (Task Battery or Report Writing): Participants who opted
out of the HSR portion continued to write a report on the cyber task (continuing the
red team briefing). Participants who opted into the HSR portion complete the fol-
lowing tasks in order: Day 2 Cyber Task Questionnaire (hard copy), Deception Ques-
tionnaire (hard copy), Operation Span (computer), Need for Cognition (computer),
Remote Associates Task (computer), Sandia Matrices (computer), Insight/Analytical
Problem Solving (computer), and Sleep Quality Questionnaire (computer).
5:15 P.M. to 5:30 P.M. (Wrap-Up): Participants were debriefed and reminded not
to discuss the task with others. Proctors handed out gift cards and collected the
Empatica E4 devices from participants who participated in the HSR portion of the
study.
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